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I.
INTRODUCTION: THE VALUE OF TRADEMARK THEORY
The current foundations of existing trademark systems employ a
utilitarian and economic model for the justification of trademarks. Such
attempts aim to widen the scope of protection accorded to trademarks on the
premise that this is essential to recognize the maximum of protection to
trademarks owners. This is to provide them with the incentive to produce
high quality products. Therefore, this deployment of the utilitarian and
economic model has led to the introduction of the dilution concept, which
monopolizes rights in trademarks and prevents any public access to
trademarks. This contradicts the constitutional clause in the United States
which permits the adoption of a utilitarian, economic justification as the
basis for protection of copyrights and patents only. Thus a trademark
system should not be based on utilitarian and economic grounds in order to
comply with this constitutional requirement. 2
Since a theoretical approach is used by current existing trademark
systems for legitimizing new concepts in the area of trademarks, it seems
evident that revisiting the philosophical foundations of trademarks is crucial
in challenging the existing protection of trademarks. Therefore, this article
aims to discuss the theoretical framework for trademarks. It stresses the
need to rethink an alternative theoretical framework which would recognize
the rights of the owner, but at the same time prevent trademarks from
becoming ugly monopolistic tools. Rather, trademark systems should aim to
foster the culture of societies through their main function as identifiers of
sources and origins. Thus, a theoretical approach which shall recognize the
rights of trademark owners and allow more public access to trademarks,
especially in cultural and expressive contexts, and recognizing the rights of
other rivals in the marketplace to promote an environment of free and fair
competition, will be seen as a suitable theoretical framework for justifying
trademark systems. As a result, the aim of this article is not to envision a
formula for trademarks protection. Rather, it aims to achieve a suitable
theoretical justification for trademarks, leaving the translation of this theory
within trademark systems to further scholarship.
The aim of this article is to tackle the theories that might be able to
justify trademarks. Its purpose is to answer some fundamental questions
such as: Is theory really necessary to trademarks justification? To what
extent does the value of theory influence trademark systems? Are these
theories eligible and capable of justifying trademarks? Should only one
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); infra
note 133 and accompanying text.
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theory be adopted from amongst such theories that could justify
trademarks? Or is it probable that a mixture of two or more theories could
be an ideal formula for the philosophical justification of trademarks?
In particular, this article is devoted to arguing and stressing the fact
that theory is vital and essential in regards to trademarks. 3 It is, indeed, a
suitable framework to achieve a balance between the rights of the owner
and the rights of the consuming public. The importance of trademark
justification derives from its ability to shape the appropriate legal system
for trademarks and to identify its boundaries and limits.
Legal scholarship is divided as regards the importance of theory
relating to intellectual property rights. Some scholars argue that from a
practical point of view, it is not necessary to tackle the appropriate
justification for trademarks or intellectual property rights in general. 4
However, it is important to study the philosophical foundations of
trademarks and intellectual property rights because this philosophy is
crucial to understanding the policy behind any piece of legislation. More
specifically, it is important because it is the guideline that determines the
rights granted and to legitimize their grant, as well as to determine the
obligations imposed and the reasons for this. In the context of trademarks,
such a philosophical justification is vital to admit the right of the public,
which is an ignored right for a long period of time, and to provide a balance
between rights holders' rights and interests.
Amongst the theories that justify trademarks are theories that have
been formulated a long time ago.5 It could be questioned whether it is
appropriate to justify current and modem trademark systems according to
such ancient theoretical frameworks. I believe that historical background
and theories are relevant to trademarks justification for two reasons. First,
3 William Fisher argues that the study of theories has considerable value, because they
"can help identify nonobvious attractive resolutions of particular problems . . . they can
[also] foster valuable considerations among the various participants in the lawmaking
process." He concludes that another reason "why intellectual-property theory retains value is
that it can catalyze useful conversations among the various people and institutions
responsible for the shaping of the law." See, William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual
Property in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 194, 198
(Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/AcademicAffairs/coursepages/tfisher/iptheory.html (last
visited May 23, 2006).
4 Andreas Rahmatian, Copyright and Commodification, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
371, 374 (2005). Rahmatian's argument is regarding copyright justification, but this
argument could also be applicable to trademarks, because when it comes to justifications, the
same theoretical background could be discussed in most of intellectual property rights.
However, Rahmatian argues that "[f]rom a strictly positivist view, these justifications of
copyright as a property fight are not (or no longer) necessary. One could say that copyright is
a property right because Parliament said so."
5 Such as Locke's labour theory, and Hegel's personality theory.
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studying inadequacies of such old justifications is important because it
opens the way for further theoretical argument, which shall, in turn, lead to
more arguments regarding trademarks resulting in finding the appropriate
justification thereof. Second, "history may be useful in the study of
intellectual property law-related topics," 6 because when any study of
history is tackled, it emphasizes the points that are uncovered in a particular
theory strengthening the argument because it supports why the adopted
framework is most appropriate.
Scholars do not agree on the suitable theoretical framework for
intellectual property justification. Some argue that "intellectual property is
either labor or personality, or it is theft.",7 Others divide intellectual
property justification in accordance with their own criteria. For example,
Peter Menell divides intellectual property theories into utilitarian and non-
utilitarian theories; in the latter he provides a list of eight theories of
intellectual property theories. 8 Others find it appropriate to provide an open
ended list, but essential name and discuss six major theories. 9
This article uses a number of the most cited theories for the
justification of tangible property, and a couple of which are used by some
scholars to justify intangible properties; these are the Labour and
Personhood theories. It also considers utilitarian and economic theories
which are relied upon by the majority of existing legal regimes to justify
trademark systems. Last but not least, the emphasis shall be directed
towards the Social-Planning theory which, I shall argue, is the ideal
foundation for trademark protection. In sum, I shall discuss four theories:
Labour theory, Personhood theory, utilitarian and economic theory, and
finally the Social-Planning theory.
6 Jeremy Phillips & llanah Simon, Going Down in History: Does History Have
Anything to Offer Today's Intellectual Property Lawyer, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 225, 233 (2005).
7 Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 290 (1988).
8 Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
ECONOMICS: VOLUME II, 129, 156-163 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds.,
Edward Elger, Cheltenham UK 2000). Menel's division is based on the rationale of
supporting a utilitarian justification of intellectual property. Hence, in the first section he
discusses the utilitarian argument in depth, then comes the second section, in which he refers
to the following theories: Natural Rights/Labor Theory, Unjust Enrichment, Personhood
Theory, Libertarian Theories, Distributive Justice, Democratic Theories, Radical/Socialist
Theories and the Ecological Theories.
9 Lior Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, I INTELL. PROP. Q. 55, 56 (2006).
Zemer provides a list of six major theories of intellectual property rights, these being: the
utilitarian approach, the labour theory of property, the personhood theory, the social-
institutional-planning, the traditional proprietarianism and the authorial constructionism.
This is an open ended list, and opens the gate for further theories and sub-theories which
shall foster the efforts in the search of philosophical clarity.
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II.
LABOR BASED JUSTIFICATION
A. Locke's theory
Locke's labor theory is part of a larger theoretical framework, upon
which property could be justified. Locke's theory, as well as other theories,
could be referred to under the title of "Natural Rights." For example, the
notion of the "Occupancy Theory" is found in the legal literature based on
Roman law. According to the "Occupancy Theory," the first person to
physically possess and occupy an object obtains a natural right to possess it
and acquires property rights upon it, on condition that this object is in the
commons and is eligible for appropriation. 10 However, the argument in this
article will be restricted to Locke's labor theory, as it is the best
manifestation of natural rights theories.
A labor based justification of property rights finds its origins in John
Locke's Two Treatises of Government, a text written almost three centuries
ago. When Locke stated his ideas about property, it was intended to cover
only real tangible property and was not intended by any means to cover
intellectual property rights such as trademarks rights.' 1
Locke started his treatise of property by describing the state of nature;
he believed that God had given the earth to the children of man, and this
earth had been given to them in common. 12 In such a situation it is
impossible for any man to have any property, however, earth has been
given to man to make the best advantage of life, and to support and comfort
their being. 13 God grants this bounty to humanity for its enjoyment, but
goods held in common could not be enjoyed in their natural state. 14 Despite
the premise that no one shall posses any property, Locke argued that:
[t]hough the earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men,
yet every Man has a property in his own Person. This no Body has any
10 Kenneth L. Port, The "'Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal
Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 525, 559-560 (1995).
II PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 47 (1996). See also Seana
V. Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 138, 154 (Stephen Munzer ed., 2001).
12 JoiHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 304 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1964) (1690).
13 Id.
14 Hughes, supra note 7, at 297. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky argue that
Locke's treatise is based on the idea that the person who removes an object from the state of
nature can claim private property over it. They argue that "Locke also added a utilitarian
dimension by claiming that objects could not be beneficial to mankind until reduced to
private property." Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 531, 542 (2005).
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Right to bit himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands,
we may say are properly his. What so ever then he removes out of the State
that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and
joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. 15
The applicability of the labor theory on intellectual property rights is
certainly appealing. In some instances one may say that it applies to
intangible property in general and to intellectual property rights in particular
more than it does to real property, upon which Locke presented his theory
of property. 16 Some commentators argue that the notion of owning one's
self embraces the ownership of one's mind, hence mixing labor of intellect
or mind entitles the laborer to private ownership. 17 "A person's labour and
its product are inseparable, and so ownership of one can be secured only by
owning the other." 18 However, in the field of trademarks, Locke's theory of
property is not applicable, even though I believe that a labor based
justification is most appropriate to justify other types of intellectual
property rights such as patents,19 but not trademarks.
Locke's theory is subject to a number of restrictions and conditions;
these are known as the "no harm principle." 20 This principle means that
after the appropriation of objects held in common, commoners suffer due to
such acquisition. 2 1 This principle ensures that the natural right of
acquisition through labor does not conflict with the common good.22 The
"no harm principle" consists of two conditions: the "enough and as good
condition" and the "non-waste condition."
2 3
15 LOCKE, supra note 12, 305-06.
16 Carys J. Craig, Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author's Right: A Warning Against a
Lockean Approach to Copyright Law, 28 QUEEN'S L.J. 1, 23 (2002). See also Shiffrin, supra
note 11, at 139.
17 Horacio M. Spector, An Outline of a Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial
Property Rights, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 270, 271 (1989).
18 Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 37
(1989).
19 For example, patents could be justified upon labor theory. The effort devoted to the
production of a new invention, which involves an inventive step and contributes in the
development of pervious art, is - in my opinion - an ideal manifestation for Locke's notion
of labor and its entitlement for private ownership. See Port, supra note 10, at 562.
20 Zemer, supra note 9, at 63.
21 Fisher, supra note 3, at 188.
22 Zemer, supra note 9, at 63.
23 Locke, supra note 12, at 309-314. See also Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of
Intellectual Property 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 78 (1997); Zemer, supra note 9, at 63;
Hughes, supra note 7, at 297-298.
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B. The "enough and as good condition " 24
Locke's treatise of property stipulates that ownership of one's self
entitles mankind to the fruits of his/her labor, and "[a]s much Land as Man
Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is
his Property." 2 5 This view of Locke includes a natural limit of one's
property, and indicates that work is a requirement and prerequisite for
property and ownership.
In Locke's common and primitive state, there are sufficient objects to
satisfy the needs of all commoners. "[I]n this primitive state there are
enough unclaimed goods so that everyone can appropriate the objects of his
labour without infringing upon goods that have been appropriated by
someone else."
26
However, if "the appropriation of an unowned object worsens the
situation of others," 27 then such an ownership is prohibited. Individual
possession should not involve prejudice to other men. 28 Locke explains that
a man is entitled to private property as long as there is enough and as good
left to others. In Locke's words: "[n]or was the appropriation of any parcel
of Land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other Man, since there was
still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could
use."
29
Introducing such a restriction over the right to appropriate arose for
various reasons; Locke intended to ensure that other commoners did not
complain about such appropriation because, after the appropriation, there
would still remain objects of similar quality and quantity, i.e. that the
situation of others would not be worse. 30 Locke also intended to assert that
his view did not embody any kind of immoral inequality, 3 1 and safeguarded
the right of access to common materials for all individual commoners.
32
C. The "non-waste condition "33
Some commentators regard the non-waste condition "as an ugly step-
24 Also known as the "enough and as good proviso", others name this condition as "the
sufficiency limitation". JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 210 (1988);
and others name it as the "no loss to others precondition". Hettinger, supra note 18, at 44.
25 See LOCKE, supra note 12, at 308.
26 Hughes, supra note 7, at 297.
27 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 175 (1974).
28 Walton H. Hamilton, Property - According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864, 867 (1932).
29 See LOCKE, supra note 12, at 309; see also NOZICK, supra note 27, at 175.
30 Spector, supra note 17, at 270.
31 Hughes, supra note 7, at 297.
32 GOPAL SREENIVASAN, THE LIMITS OF LOCKEAN RIGHTS IN PROPERTY 113 (1995).
33 Also known as the "no spoilation proviso", Craig, supra note 16, at 11.
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sister of the enough and as good condition," 34 while others have questioned
the need of this condition in the presence of the "enough and as good"
condition. 3
5
For Locke, "[n]o one was entitled to more than was necessary for
[his/her] subsistence,.., because the excess would spoil before it could be
consumed."'36 He considered this as an offence "against the common Law
of Nature." 37 Hence, no person should appropriate more than the amount
he/she can use. Locke demonstrates this limitation by stating that: "[a]s
much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils;
so much he may by his labour fix a Property in.... Nothing was made by
God for Man to spoil or destroy."
38
This condition, if applied to trademarks, means that not using the mark
is a waste, according to Locke's non-waste limitation. Thus, one shall not
be able to appropriate a mark if one is not intending to use it. Although
trademarks are not literally perishable and could not be spoiled, not using a
mark is indeed true waste. The trademark owner shall have monopoly rights
over his/her mark, and if it is not used then this is waste because others
could have made use out of it.
This condition is not intended to limit the amount which one can
appropriate, as the amount of labor one is capable of expending determines
one's property. Rather this condition provides that one can appropriate as
much as one can labor, but one should "not let anything perish uselessly in
[one's] possession." 39 However, a spoiled object is wasted because it
"might be the Possession of any other," 40 and others could have benefited
from it. The solution, from a Lockean perspective, is the transformation to a
money economy. Every individual could exchange whatever is more than
what he can consume with money: a lasting, unspoilable object.41 By its
very nature, "money is imperishable and thus unaffected by the spoilage
limitation," because it could be accumulated indefinitely without violating
the non-waste condition.42
D. Critiques to a labor based justification to trademarks
A point of crucial importance is assessing the applicability of a labor
34 Hughes, supra note 7, at 325.
35 NOZICK, supra note 27, at 175-76.
36 Donna M. Byrne, Locke, Property, and Progressive Taxes, 78 NEB. L. REV. 700, 706
(1999).
37 LOCKE, supra note 12, at 313.
38 Id. at 308.
39 WALDRON, supra note 24, at 209.
40 LOCKE, supra note 12, at 313.
41 Id. at 318-20.
42 SREENIVASAN, supra note 32, at 35.
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based justification of trademarks. Clearly, Locke's theory of property relies
upon exerting labor, which means that labor is the basis for ownership
entitlement. It is a matter of conjecture whether the rationale for the labor
theory of property applies to trademarks; whether producing a trademark
requires any kind of labor and whether the rights accorded to the laborer are
equivalent to the amount of mental labor exerted in creating a trademark. A
starting point is to assess Locke's original theory insofar as it was intended
to be applied to tangible property and citing some important theoretical
inadequacies in it, and then to question Locke's notions of "commons" and
"mixing labour" as related to trademark. The purpose of this is to assess
Locke's conditions or limitations. Finally, it will be concluded that this
theory falls short of the mark in justifying trademarks.
First, as mentioned earlier, Locke's labor theory was formulated to
cover and deal with tangible physical property. It was not, by any means,
directed at justifying or legitimizing intangibles or intellectual property
rights in general, or trademarks in particular. The case of tangible property
is, indeed, different from intangible property.
The difference between tangible and intellectual property is that, in the
first case, the law attaches rights to material things which exist in the
physical world independently from the law ... while in case of intellectual
property, the law creates an abstract object and, additionally, confers rights
over that abstract object ... 43
Another difference between tangible property and intangible property
is that in the former, when others are using someone's tangibles, they are
depriving the owner of exercising his/her rights over the property, whereas
in the latter, using intangibles of others will not cause any harm to the
owner because such use will not affect the owner's enjoyment. 44 This might
be a starting point from which to assess the premises of this theory, and
whether this difference between tangible and intangible properties could
affect their legitimizing.
The premises that Locke started with prevent its applicability to
trademarks. He started from the proposition that no person is entitled to any
43 Rahmatian, supra note 4, at 373. Stephen Carter, argues that "it is so difficult to
justify intellectual property rules with the same arguments used to justify a system of
property rights in things that you can hold in your hands or hide from your neighbor or fence
off." Stephen L. Carter, Owning What Doesn't Exist, 13 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99
(1990). Contrary to this vision, Frank Easterbrook argues that "[i]ntellectual property is no
less the fruit of one's labor than is physical property." Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual
Property is Still Property, 13 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108, 113 (1990).
44 ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION CONTROL 103, 105-06
(2d ed. 2006). Spyros Maniatis argues that unlike physical property, "[i]deas are not
destroyed by consumption, therefore property rights in them do not need to be, and cannot
be, absolutely exclusive." Spyros M. Maniatis, Trade Mark Rights- A Justification Based on
Property, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 123, 150 (2002).
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kind of property rights, but to his/her own person. Such ownership of one's
body or self entitles a person to labor, and the outcome of this labor is the
property and the private right of the laborer. Locke's rationale is that
objects in the commons "are not useful to anyone, [thus,] an individual
exerts labour upon the object and transforms it into something useful and
worthy of property ownership. '45 However, this rationale is not convincing.
For example, in the case of trademarks, if the commons in the trademarks
context are words, then their existence before someone labors on a mark
and transforms it into property, as Locke's theory suggests, are useful as a
means of communication amongst individuals.4
6
Moreover, the premise that in the state of nature everything belongs to
men and that they share everything therein seems to be undermined by the
fact that if "one takes a particular item from the common, one violates the
right of other commoners, to whom this particular item also belongs"
47
because in Locke's commons everything belongs to all individuals. It seems
that Locke has implicitly acknowledged this problem, and in solving it he
argues that "taking any part of what is common ... does not depend on the
express consent of all the Commoners." 48 The appropriation of objects in
Locke's common in real property is different than the appropriation of ideas
and cultural property in intellectual property rights in that the former does
not depend on the express consent of all the commoners, but by contrast,
the latter does.49 Hence, the "appropriation of real property commons can
take place without the assent of others[, whereas a]cquiring cultural
property requires consent." 5
0
Locke has stated that property is justified when someone mixes his/her
labor with objects from the commons. This rationale has been a matter of
criticism. First, in the context of trademarks, what is the "commons?" 51 Is it
the words already existing in the language? If this is the case, then this
could not be applied to trademarks for various reasons, mainly because this
45 Port, supra note 10, at 561.
46 It is also unclear why Locke would have wished to start from the premise that no
individual is entitled to ownership, then make the exclusion that mixing labor with objects
grants the laborer an entitlement over the object. Alternatively, he could have simply argued
that in the state of nature nothing belongs to anyone, and mixing labor is the base for
ownership.
47 Zemer, supra note 9, at 62. See also Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 144-145;
SREENIVASAN, supra note 32, at 24.
48 LOCKE, supra note 12, at 307. See also Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright
Lockean, 29 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 891, 915 (2005-2006).
49 Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 30 (1999).
50 Id.
51 It is worth noting that Locke did not define the meaning for the expression
"commons." It remains unclear what these commons in Locke's original work was making it
more difficult to define it regarding trademarks.
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"common" does not exist; in many instances the trademark owner creates a
word that has never existed before, such as the KODAK trademark. This
example demolishes Locke's argument about the commons, simply because
this word (KODAK) is an invented word and did not exist in the commons;
hence no one could labor on it and appropriate it for him/herself out of the
commons because it never existed in the commons. Or could this common
be any new invented word? When Locke was referring to the commons, he
meant objects that already existed, at least as raw materials, and in order for
someone to deserve owning them he/she should mix his/her labor with
them. Furthermore, it is questionable whether a trademark could be
considered an object per se; a trademark is more a right and entitlement of
rights than an object because trademarks are intangibles and they could not
be objects. Thus trademark legislations grant the owners rights over their
trademarks such as the right of using the mark and preventing others from
using it for the same class of goods and/or services.
Commentators have also questioned the premise about the commons
and the mixing of labor. For example, Jeremy Waldron questions the
Lockean premise that mixing one's labor over an object entitles the laborer
to appropriate this object. He refuses the idea that labor could be mixed
from the outset with an object, and argues that "the only things that can be
mixed with objects are other objects. But labour consists of actions not
objects." 52 He concludes that "the ordinary notion of mixing seems quite
inappropriate to the case Locke is describing." 53 This mixing rationale
seems to be somewhat vague in Locke's argument.
However, if we agree for the sake of argument that the commons of
words exists, and one could mix one's labor with words in the common,
still Locke's theory cannot justify why this mixing could justify owning this
object. Nor does it justify why the efforts and labor exerted did not go in
vain, or that they have not been lost. Nozick has posed an important
question: he wonders why mixing one's labor with an object held in
common entitles a person to actually own this object,54 and furthermore
asks why mixing one's labor in something is not a way of losing what one
owns: (his/her labor). 55 He goes on to suggest that "labouring on something
52 WALDRON, supra note 24, at 185.
53 Id. at 186.
54 SREENIVASAN, supra note 32, at 142 (arguing that Locke did not explain the reason
why "the appropriation of particular things is legitimated by one's labouring on them.");
Spector, supra note 17, at 272 (arguing that the assumption that "the mixing of an unowned
object with something that has an owner results in the owner's acquiring ownership over the
whole thing ... lacks a plausible deontological justification.").
55 NOZiCK, supra note 27, at 174-75 (giving an example illustrating his idea, providing:
"If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules ... mingle evenly
throughout the sea, do I thereby own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato
juice?"). See also WALDRON, supra note 24, at 188 (arguing that the labour exerted upon an
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improves it and makes it more valuable." 56 This is called the "value added"
labor principle. 57 This principle argues that labor produces a social value;
such a value deserves reward by granting property rights. 58 The "value
added" principle has been subject to opposition, because "even if one
assumes that the value of these products is entirely the result of human
labor, this value is not entirely attributable to any particular laboror."
59
However, the argument of the "value added" labor principle contradicts the
fact that in the case of trademarks, property rights are granted before the
trademark is in actual use. Most trademark legislations require the intention
of using marks in the field of trade. This leads to the fact that property
rights are granted before any social value has resulted from the mark, and it
shall be argued that it is the consuming public who add this value, not the
laborer. Hence, it may be concluded that the "value added" theory does not
justify the granting of property rights over trademarks.
Other scholars have sought to determine what kind of labor is
necessary to satisfy the labor theory content, 60 and some of them
demonstrate that the production of ideas does come from somewhere; it
needs a certain amount of labor.61 Others have argued that in some
instances the idea occurs to the owner without any kind of labor or
innovative thought, while in other instances it comes by way of
coincidence. This occurs, for example, when one trader uses his/her family
name as a trademark, where the exertion of labor could not be truly
claimed, i.e. when the labor exerted in the creation of the mark is not
consistent with Locke's notion of labor exertion, or when the trademark
owner simply takes an existing word and uses it as a trademark without
exerting labor in its creation. One example is the use of a word in a different
object 'is to all intents and purposes lost in the object.'); Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 148
(asking "Why does one thereby gain the property by presumptuous expenditure instead of
losing one's labor.").
56 NOZICK, supra note 27, at 175. See also Hettinger, supra note 18, at 37-38 (It is
argued that -in a Lockean context- the purpose of mixing labour is to conclude something
useful, this argument is similar to Nozick's argument). See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks
Unplugged, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 441, 447 (1994) ("John Locke is credited with the
observation that he who takes something out of a state of nature to create something useful
thereby makes it his property.").
57 NoziCK, supra note 27, at 175; see also Hughes, supra note 7, at 305 (Also called the
"labor-desert" principle).
58 Hughes, supra note 7, at 305.
59 Hettinger, supra note 18, at 38. Hettinger also argues that the separation of the
creator's contribution from the "historicallsocial component is no easy task," and such a
separation ignores the vast contribution of others. He stipulates that all those who
contributed in the creation of the work should receive their share from the market value of
the work, and the fact that they may not be present does not entitle the labourer who
provided the "added value" to the entire market value.
60 Maniatis, supra note 44, at 142-45; see also Hughes supra note 7, at 300-05.
61 Hughes, supra note 7, at 300-01.
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context: for instance using the word "Table" as a trademark for computers.
Maniatis argues that "[t]he production of innovative ideas, for
example, may not be the hard form of labouring that deserves reward by the
allocation of property rights." 62 Afterwards, he reaches a different
conclusion: he divides applying the labor theory to trademarks into three
steps. First, he examines if there is any labor in trademarks. He argues that
labor in this context is manifested in the plan of choosing a mark, putting it
into circulation and the investment in building up goodwill. Second, he
examines the common of marks. Although he acknowledges that commons
of trademarks could be limited, he argues that the subject matter of property
is the linkage between the mark and the product, not the mark itself, which
does not affect the commons. Third, he discusses the commons and Locke's
two conditions, and reaches the conclusion that trademarks fulfill the labor
theory requirements!
63
However, there should be a distinction between the production of the
trademark itself and producing the article to which the mark is attached.
This is because the labor theory when applied to trademarks discusses the
labor used to create the mark, not the labor for producing the product or
article itself. It seems that Maniatis mixes the two. It could be argued that
the production of trademarks does not include any kind of labor, in the
sense of Locke's theory. According to such an argument, the mere act of
choosing a name from the common of words or symbols and affixing it to
goods or services does not include labor. Trademarks are examples of
things that are made effortlessly. 64 Perhaps, the best emphasis of the
argument that trademarks lack labor in their creation is in the words of the
U.S. Supreme Court: "Trademarks do not depend upon novelty, invention,
discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no
genius, no laborious thought. Trademarks are simply founded on priority of
appropriation.
'
"
6 5
However, contrary to this argument, the production of trademarks
includes some kind of mental labor. The hurdle that faces the applicability
of the Lockean approach over trademarks is that the amount of labor
exerted in the production of a trademark could not be compared with the
extent of rights and entitlements that the proprietor of a trademark enjoys.
Trademarks owners have the exclusive right to enjoy a monopoly over their
marks, and to exclude others from using them - a right that could
potentially last forever. It is hard to imagine that such rights could be
62 Maniatis, supra note 44, at 142.
63 Id. at 145-53.
64 See generally NOZICK, supra note 27, at 175.
65 Kenneth L. Port, Foreword: Symposium on Intellectual Property Law Theory, CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 585, 594 (1992-1993) (citing The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)).
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justified upon the mental effort of creating the mark according to the
Lockean justification of property. However, "[a]lthough intellectual
laborers often deserve rewards for their labor, [intellectual property
systems] may give the labourer much more or much less than is
deserved."' 66 I believe that the amount of rights a trademark owner holds is
much more than could be justified as a result of a Lockean based
justification. According to Locke, when a person exerts labor on an object
then he/she gains property rights over this object, but in the context of
trademarks the owner is granted more rights than what Locke intended. A
trademark owner secures a monopoly over the mark, and thus, his/her rights
are more than the rights conferred under Locke's theory.
E. Locke's limitations and trademarks
When it comes to Locke's "enough and as good condition", one might
suggest that applying this condition to intellectual property rights, and in
particular, to trademarks does not create any hurdle or difficulty; 67 the
commons of words are infinite and inexhaustible 68 and there will always
remain enough and as good left to others. 69
On the contrary, if Locke's condition is to be applied strictly, then if
someone labors on a mark from the commons and turns it to his/her
property, and then he/she has a monopoly over this mark. In this sense,
others would be worse off due to the fact that his/her appropriation left a
loss in the commons in which others could have made use. Thus, in the
field of trademarks, there will not be enough and as good for others to
appropriate. Moreover, when someone appropriates a trademark then
logically he/she has improved their situation; consequently, all other
commoners are worse off. Hence "a person's situation is prima facie made
worse by his losing the opportunity to appropriate" 70 what others have
already appropriated. Lessig has provided a similar argument in the field of
copyright, but it also supports this idea in trademarks. He describes the
situation of Walt Disney, who created a motion picture character based on a
character from the commons. The commons were then open to creators to
develop because legislation then did not impose restrictions on their use by
others. Lessig then compares the situation of first comers (such as Walt
Disney) and second comers; whereas the former were free to use the
commons and make great use of it, the second comers were not able to use
66 Hettinger, supra note 18, at 51.
67 Maniatis, supra note 44, at 149 (arguing that the common of trademarks is
inexhaustible, which fulfills Locke's condition).
68 Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 140.
69 Hughes, supra note 7, at 315.
70 WALDRON, supra note 24, at 215.
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the commons in the same sense that was available to first comers. Thus,
they could not have the benefit of the commons. He argues that "the new
creators, the new Walt Disneys, must fight this system of legal regulation to
find a right to speak.",7 1 In this context, Zemer provides an interesting
example. He argues that
[i]f I pick strawberries from a wild field, it is obvious that the amount
of strawberries available for others has been reduced, and no one will be
able to pick exactly the same strawberry. But in the next season there will
be more strawberries because I did not destroy the field.., but unless I
uproot the strawberry bushes and leave no potential for future growth, I did
not violate the condition. 72
Based on Zemer's example, if a word is taken from the common of
words, to which its appropriator is granted property rights which are
exclusive in their nature, then this amounts to "uprooting" the mark because
the "potential future growth" of this word is hindered. That is, other traders
will not be allowed to use similar marks on dissimilar products, and the
public would be prevented from their rights in terms of the meaning-making
of cultural signs. "Therefore, granting an unconditional monopoly-type
right for one's [trademark] works resembles a situation where one destroys
the strawberry field."'73 Thus Locke's condition is not applicable.
This means that the "enough and as good" condition cannot be applied
to trademarks because even if ideas are inexhaustible, they are not always
under the common's grasp.74 This is because an idea stems from a former
idea, and the new idea is the gateway for further ideas. 75 Thus, granting
monopolistic property rights over an idea will affect the common of marks
and will not leave as good and as enough to others. This will inevitably
harm the situation of second comers because first comers have enjoyed
more resources than others.
As regards Locke's limitation of "non-waste", this condition is
different from the "enough and as good condition" regarding its
applicability to trademarks. Trademark legislations contain rules that are
similar in their content to the non-waste condition, which is the cancellation
of the trademark registration for non-use. 76 The cancellation for non-use
71 Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 65 MONT. L. REV. 1,9 (2004).
72 Zemer, supra note 48, at 931-32.
73 Id. at 933.
74 Craig, supra note 16, at 24.
75 Id.; see also Lessig, supra note 71, at 12 (arguing that providing a balance in the grant
of proprietary rights "will enable a different kind of creativity: creativity built upon a
tradition of building upon the works of others, freely. A free culture, not the permission
culture that our law has produced.").
76 See e.g., Trademarks (Lanham) Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004); Trade Marks Act,
1994, ch. 26, §46(1) (Eng.).
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concept provides that if the trademark is not used in the course of trade for a
certain period of time, it is subject to cancellation upon request from any
party with interest. Hence, this condition, as applied to trademarks, does
conflict with Locke's argument.
In conclusion, because of the inadequacies in Locke's theory, and
because it is not designed to justify intangible property, the labor theory
does not apply to nor justify the trademark system. There is no sufficient
amount of mental labor available to the granting of property rights,
according to Locke's notion. The high level of protection of trademarks
cannot be justified by the mental labor of creating the mark. Moreover, the
mental labor of creating a trademark cannot be justified on the basis of
Locke's rationale and his "enough and as good proviso", because the
commons of words will be affected due to the fact that if one appropriates a
mark then he/she gains a monopoly that could potentially last forever.
Hence, other commoners will be worse off, which contradicts Locke's
rationale.
III.
THE PERSONHOOD THEORY
A. Hegel's theory
The personhood approach to property finds its roots in the writings of
Georg Wilhelm Hegel. In his work Natural Law and Political Science in
Outline; Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel embodies his treatise
of property.
Hegel avoids a historical argument about the primitive state of
nature. 77 Rather, the Hegelian theory derives from the premise that "private
property rights are crucial to the satisfaction of some fundamental human
needs," 78 such as "self-actualisation and recognition of an individual
person." 79 According to Hegel, "[a] person must translate his freedom into
an external sphere in order to exist as Idea." 80 This freedom is best
expressed and translated into the acquisition of property rights. 81 Hegel also
intended to avoid a utilitarian argument for property rights, according to
which properties are not means to satisfy our needs, rather they are "the first
77 Peter G. Stillman, Hegel's Analysis of Property in the Philosophy of Right, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1989).
78 Fisher, supra note 3, at 171.
79 Port, supra note 10, at 563; see also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 542.
80 GEORG WILHELM HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 40 (T. M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1952) (1821).
81 Zemer, supra note 9, at 63-64.
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embodiment of freedom." 82 "The premise underlying the personhood
prospective is that to achieve proper self-development - to be a person - an
individual needs some control over resources in the external environment.
The necessary assurances of control take the form of property rights."83
As with the Lockean approach, Hegel argues that a person has natural
possession of his/her body,84 and such possession of one's body derives
from the control of the mind or will of the person over his/her body. 85 The
concept of self-possession requires "[t]hat the body be gradually modified
and turned to the will's purposes so that it becomes increasingly difficult
for the agent or anyone else to view his body, especially in action, without
taking into account its essentially will-govered character." 86
However, Locke's premise is that a person owns himself/herself as
his/her property, and the property of one's self entitles him/her to own
property, whereas Hegel's notion of one's natural possession "is neither
automatic nor easy, but a long struggle in claiming one's self and
developing one's individuality." 87
A person should manifest his/her will within the external world, and
this manifestation is part of one's personality and is a reflection of it.
Hence, Hegel considers the will as the core of one's existence seeking
effectiveness and self actualization. 88 Hegel argues that anything that a
person puts his/her will into makes it the property of him/her, and he/she
may appropriate it89 because "property is the first embodiment of freedom
and so is in itself a substantive end."90
Unlike Locke's labor theory, "Hegel has a much more direct approach
to intellectual property." 9 1 He argues that
[m]ental aptitudes, erudition, artistic skill, even things ecclesiastical
82 Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of
Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 817, 837 (1990).
83 Margaret G. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1981-
1982); see also Maniatis, supra note 44, at 154 (arguing that, "[t]he nucleus of the theory lies
in the existence of 'personality', that provides the means to start the journey out from
oneself. Only when that is completed can a person claim to know her\himself 'as united in its
innermost being with the truth'.").
84 HEGEL, supra note 80, at 40; see also Hughes, supra note 7, at 332; Maniatis, supra
note 44, at 154.
85 WALDRON, supra note 24, at 361.
86 Id. at 363.
87 Stillman, supra note 77, at 1040.
88 Hughes, supra note 7, at 331; see also William W. Fisher, Property and Contract on
the Internet, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1203, 1214 (1998) (clarifying that the heart of the
personality approach "is that private property rights are crucial to the satisfaction of some
fundamental human needs or interests.").
89 HEGEL, supra note 80, at 41.
90 Id. at 42.
91 Maniatis, supra note 44, at 161.
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(like sermons, masses, prayers, consecration of votive objects), inventions,
and so forth, become subjects of a contract, brought on to a parity through
being bought and sold, with things recognised as things. It may be asked
whether the artist, scholar, &c., is from the legal point of view in possession
of his art, erudition, ability to preach a sermon, sing a mass, &c., that is,
whether such attainments are 'things'... 92
After acknowledging the existence of intellectual creations, Hegel
develops an argument as to whether such creations could be considered
"things" or not.93 He argues that they could not be "things" on the basis that
they are "owned by [the] free mind" stipulating that they "are something
internal and not external to it."94 He then concludes that there is no harm in
calling them "things" since they should be affixed into a material support,
which is something external and hence could be called "things."
95
For Hegel, an intention to own something and make it someone's
property is not enough. There should be a "physical relation" between the
proprietor and the thing.96 He argues that "[s]ince property is the
embodiment of personality, my inward idea and will that something is to be
mine is not enough to make it my property; to secure this end occupancy is
requisite." 97
Such a notion of occupancy from a Hegelian perspective takes one of
two forms: either taking possession of an object or through using it. 98
Taking possession of an object is initiated "by directly grasping it
physically, by forming it and by merely marking it as ours." 99 It is this last
form which is related to the subject of trademarks. Hegel stipulates that
marking "is not actual but is only representative of my will ... and the
meaning of the mark is supposed to be that I have put my will into the
thing."' 100
Hegel has discussed his ideas about alienation in his treatise.
According to him, anyone could freely alienate his/her property and
withdraw his/her will from the object' 01 insofar as he/she puts his/her will
92 HEGEL, supra note 80, at 40.
93 Id.
94 Id. at41.
95 Id. at 40-41.
96 Maniatis, supra note 44, at 160; see also Port, supra note 10, at 564; WALDRON, supra
note 24, at 363 (stipulating that according to Hegel there should exist "some physical
relation between the body inhabited by the will in question and the external object in which
that will is to be embodied.").
97 HEGEL, supra note 80, at 45.
98 Id. at 46.
99 Id.; see also Hughes, supra note 7, at 335; Palmer, supra note 82, at 838
100 HEGEL, supra note 80, at 49.
1o WALDRON, supra note 24, at 361, 369.
Vol 5:1
Fall 2007
into it. 10 2 However, he argues that the "substantive characteristics which
constitutes my own private personality and the universal essence of my self-
consciousness are inalienable." 10 3 He stresses that intellectual works in
particular, because of their connection with one's being and personality,
could not be alienated. He also argues that a person's body is not alienable
by its very nature because of its attachment to life and liberty; 10 4 he
stipulates that intellectual works are internal and inward to their creators
and hence inalienable. If the owner of a work of mind is entitled to alienate
his/her work, then he/she will make his/her own personality and the
substance of his/her being the property of another person. 10 5 "[O]n most
occasions the complete alienation of intellectual property is an exercise of
rights over property in an act that, by its nature, denies the personality stake
necessary to justify property rights.... Abandonment of an idea is arguably
alienation of personality."' 10 6
Hughes considers that trademarks are justifiable upon a Hegelian
perspective. However, he argues that basing such a justification upon the
rights of the consumer is weak. He contends that
[t]rademark is a right of expression for the manufacturer, not a right of
the consumer to receive information. In fact, trademarks fulfil the
recognition aspect of the personality theory of property by providing an
important means of securing respect and recognition to those who originate
the items bearing the trademark.107
Hughes' argument focuses on one party of the trademark formula; his
argument gives recognition to the "manufacturer" and denies any role of the
consuming public. Alternatively, he could have given recognition to both
parties as they are the parties involved in the creation of trademarks. 108
B. Critiques to the personhoodjustification to trademarks
In assessing the compatibility of Hegel's theory of property with
trademarks, the personality theory is not applicable to trademarks. Hegel
himself, when stating his expansive list of mental creations eligible to be
property, did not discuss trademarks. 10 9 Palmer contends that the
personality theory discusses only patents, copyrights and artistic
102 HEGEL, supra note 80, at 52.
103 Id. at 52-53.
104 Stillman, supra note 77, at 1042-45.
105 HEGEL, supra note 80, at 54.
106 Hughes, supra note 7, at 347.
107 Id. at 354.
108 See Port, supra note 10, at 565-66 (arguing that trademarks should fulfill three
competing objectives: the interest of the trademark owner, the interest of consumers and the
interest of innocent third parties).
109 HEGEL, supra note 80, at 40-41.
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creations. 11 0 Hughes argues that "[iln the field of intellectual property, the
personality justification is best applied to the arts."' 11 However, the
rationale of this theory and major points in it affect its justification for
trademarks.
After arguing that intellectual works should be disclosed to the public
to achieve their goal, Hegel stipulates that the protection of such works is
vital to ensure an advance in the field of intellectual works, and to make
people interact with and understand them. Hegel discusses the situation of
copyrights. 112 He further argues that the book as an object is external to the
creator and hence alienable because, when someone owns a copy of the
book, this copy becomes his/her "complete and free ownership."' 13 But
"the means of expression of the idea are part of the author's mind and still
belong to him."1 14 By analogy, when someone purchases an article
embodying a trademark, he/she owns this article but does not own the
trademark itself because, according to the personality theory, the trademark
as a mental aptitude remains the property of its creator. Nevertheless, the
personality theory fails to justify the fact that trademarks are assets and are
alienable as such. Hegel fails to provide any means for safeguarding and
protecting the works of the intellect, and argues that this issue should be left
to the individual's honors. 115
If a trademark system is to be justified upon the personality theory, a
number of questions will remain without clear answer, such as the transfer
of ownership of the trademark. If a trademark is a manifestation of its
proprietor's will, personality and self development, how can one's will,
personality or self development be assigned or licensed to others, especially
given that Hegel regards intellectual creations as inward and internal to the
person's personality?
Although the personhood approach - unlike the Lockean approach -
includes a justification as to intellectual property, two major arguments and
hurdles in this theory cannot be applied to trademarks: the "marking
hurdle," and the "alienability hurdle."
As regards the "marking hurdle," Hegel has argued that in order to
110 Palmer, supra note 82, at 837, 843. The personality theory is used in different
jurisdictions in Europe such as France and Germany for the justification of their copyright
systems. See Fisher, supra note 3, at 174.
111 Hughes, supra note 7, at 330; see also Palmer, supra note 82, at 844 (arguing that
"[o]nce created, works of art are independent of their creators, as should be evident by the
fact that works of art do not 'die' when their creators do.").
112 Hegel only discussed the case of copyrights thoroughly, and this is why bringing this
argument is essential to clarify Hegel's argument to intellectual property rights and to
trademarks in particular.
113 HEGEL, supra note 80, at 55.
114 Stillman, supra note 77, at 1045.
Is HEGEL, supra note 80, at 53-56.
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own an object there should be occupancy to that object. By applying
Hegel's occupancy rationale to the case of trademarks, this occupancy is
manifested in marking the object. According to Hegel, this occupancy is the
entitlement to property because this marking is the representation of the
owner's will.
It could be argued that marking establishes an excellent linkage
between Hegel's personality theory and trademarks, 116 because "[for
Hegel, the marking of our animals with a personal sign will express our will
to dominate the animals even when they are mixed with the animals of the
neighbours." 1
7
When Hegel was considering marking as a representation of the
person's will, did he mean that marking was a way of manifesting one's
will to appropriate the marked object? If so, then the will's manifestation
concerned the ownership of the object itself. Or, was he referring to
marking as the manifesting for ownership of the mark itself? 18 In this case,
the ownership of this mark does not stand up to any real basis for
justification.
However, Hegel's marking argument does not stand in order to justify
a trademark system. It could be inferred from Hegel's argument that
marking an object reflects one's will to appropriate that object. This means
that marking an object entitles the person to appropriate the object, not the
mark itself. Moreover, Hegel has asserted that marking as a way of
appropriating an object is "very indeterminate;"1 19 this might be because of
the lack of internal or inward connection between the mark and its owner.
This hurdle imposes another question as regards the degree of
personality manifested in trademarks: to what extent does the creation of a
trademark reflect the owner's personality? The creation of a trademark does
not reflect the manifestation of the owner's will, nor does it "seem to be the
personal reaction of an individual upon the nature."' 120 Trademarks are
usually owned by corporations and institutions. This leads to the fact that
trademarks are neither important nor essential for their will and self
actualization. 12 It also shows how trademark creation is distinct from the
personality and self of its owners. Moreover, trademarks are objects with
116 Maniatis, supra note 44, at 160.
117 Id.
1 I8 See Id. at 164 (arguing that the justification of a trademark passes through a "logical
sequence [in which the] human will is first embodied into the mark and then into the marked
object.").
119 HEGEL, supra note 80, at 49.
120 See Hughes, supra note 7, at 339 (although supporting the personhood justification,
admitted that the personality argument falls short in justifying "intellectual products that
appear to reflect little or no personality of their creators.").
121 Hettinger, supra note 18, at 45-47.
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market value and are transferable from one owner to another. If a trademark
is a reflection of its original owner's will, then changing the ownership of
the mark from one owner to another creates a shortage that this theory could
not explain. This shortage is manifested in the idea that this theory suggests;
that a trademark is its creator's will. This suggestion contradicts with the
idea that the ownership of a trademark could be changed because changing
this ownership means the change of the owner's will. This leads to the
second hurdle of applying this theory upon trademarks.
The "alienability hurdle" imposes a more crucial point in justifying
trademark systems. According to Hegel's rationale, any piece of property,
and trademarks in our case, represents a connection between the owner and
the owned object because this property is a manifestation of his/her self. If
property is alienable from one owner to another, this either means that the
connection between the owner and object will be harmed or that this
connection never existed. I would say that this connection between the
mark and the owner, on the basis that a trademark is a manifestation of
someone's will and self, does not exist. Hence, "[a]lienation is the denial of
th[e] personal link to an object. But if the personal link does not exist...
there is no foundation for property rights over the object ... [t]hus, the
justification for property is missing."' 122
The alienability rationale is clarified in Margaret Radin's article
"Property and Personhood." 123 Radin differentiates between two kinds of
property. 124 The first is fungible property which could be replaced with
"other goods of equal market value," 125 and such objects are alienable. The
second is personal property; 126 owners of personal property are connected
with such property (i.e. there is inward and internal value of the object in its
owner view) and are almost part of them and are not alienable. 127 This is a
subjective matter that differs from one person to the other. Personal
122 Hughes, supra note 7 at 345; see also Palmer, supra note 82, at 843 (arguing also that
the personality theory suffers from a confusion regarding the relation between the object and
its creator. He stresses that when someone translates his/her will, the outcome of this
translation is not "bound up with the person.").
123 See Radin, supra note 83, at 966 (after adopting a personhood prospective for the
justification of property, Radin starts her argument with criticizing the labor based
justification of property. According to Radin ownership of one's body -in a Lockean
context- introduces a number of contradictions; body parts such as hair, blood and organs
could be replaced and hence they become fungibles. She also questions whether body parts
that are replaced with plastic parts become parts of someone's body or not. However, she
argues that "bodily parts may be too 'personal' to be property at all.").
124 Zemer, supra note 9, at 64.
125 Radin, supra note 83, at 960.
126 The notion of "personal property" in this context means the property which is related
to its owner's personality, not the technical notion of "personal property" in the English law,
which refers to tangible property.
127 Radin, supra note 83, at 959.
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property means that "an object or an idea is intertwined with an individual's
personal identity,"' 28 and hence it is inalienable. Trademarks fall within the
ambit of the first kind of property, and are indeed fungible properties
because trademarks, as mentioned earlier, are assignable to others, have a
market value and may be the subject of licence agreements. They simply
have a market value with which they might be exchanged.
The problem with the personhood theory is that it is individualistic. It
ignores the public role in trademarks, and only considers marking as an
individual process where an individual embodies his/her will in the mark. It
fails to justify the meanings that the public attribute to trademarks, and how
this role by the public could be crucial in trademarks justification and its
effects over the culture.
The shortages in this theory are that it does not give recognition to the
public role in the process of trademarks creation; nor does it acknowledge
the public role in creating a meaning to trademarks as a way of expressing
the will and self of the public. It wrongly assumes that the owner of the
trademark is its only proprietor because it is a manifestation of his/her will
and self. It also fails to address the idea that the consuming public
contributes to the trademark creation process and that they are entitled to
the expressive and cultural use of the mark. Moreover, the will of the public
and the meaning they attribute to the mark is irrelevant and hence, the
consuming public shall not enjoy any rights in the trademarks contexts
under the personality approach.
In conclusion, it seems impossible to justify trademarks upon the
personality theory simply because the creation of trademarks does not
reflect the personality of its creator. And even though some intellectual
property rights seem to be a manifestation of their creator's personalities,
others "do not manifest any 'personality' of their creators." 129 Moreover,
they "do not seem to be the personal reaction of an individual upon
nature." 130 Hence the nature of trademarks and their use in industrial and
commercial context does not embody an expression of the personality.
Furthermore, trademarks are usually owned by corporations and
institutions; this leads to the fact that trademarks are neither important nor
essential for their existence and self actualization. 131
128 Menell, supra note 8, at 158.
129 Hughes, supra note 7, at 340.
130 Id. at 341.
131 Hettinger, supra note 18, at 45-47.
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IV.
UTILITARIAN AND ECONOMIC BASED THEORY
A. The utility and economic rationale
Unlike other intellectual property rights, 132 trademark legislations did
not embody any sign of utilitarian grounds for their justification. 133
Utilitarian grounds could be found in the Constitution of the United States
of America, in the context of providing the logical backgrounds for both
patents and copyrights systems. The Constitution stipulates that ".
Congress shall have Power To ... promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
134
In the United Kingdom, trademark legislations did not refer to
utilitarian grounds, whereas the case in copyright legislations is different.
For example, the first legislation of copyrights provided explicitly in its
preamble that this act is "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by
Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Author's or Purchasers of Such
Copies."'135 It also stated that its purpose is to prevent practices of printing
and reprinting books and other writings without the consent of the authors
or proprietors of such books and writings, and "for the encouragement of
learned men to compose and write useful books." 13
6
However, the lack of utilitarian or economic reference in trademarks
legislations does not mean that trademarks could not be subject to
justification on such grounds. A number of scholars 137 adhered to the
utilitarian theory to justify trademarks and intellectual property systems.
Peter Menell, for example, argues that utilitarianism is the principal theory
to be applied to such works and systems.138 Mcneil asserts that trademarks,
132 For example, patents and copyrights.
133 A background for justification could either be in the form of constitutional provision
denoting to such justification, or through the preamble of the legislation itself. See e.g. Trade
Marks Act, 1994, c. 26 (Eng.). The title of this Act reads as follows: "An Act to make new
provision for registered trade marks, implementing Council Directive No. 89/104/EEC of
21st December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks;
to make provision in connection with Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 of 20th December
1993 on the Community trade mark; to give effect to the Madrid Protocol Relating to the
International Registration of Marks of 27th June 1989, and to certain provisions of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20th March 1883, as revised and
amended; and for connected purposes."
134 U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8.
135 The Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Ann., c.21 (Eng.).
136 Id.
137 Such as William Landes, Richard Posner, Peter Menell, Nicholas Economides, WR
Cornish, Jennifer Phillips and others.
138 Menell, supra note 8, at 130.
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particularly, are justifiable upon utilitarian terms. In his words:
"[t]rademark law is principally concerned with ensuring that consumers are
not misled in the marketplace and hence is particularly amenable to
economic analysis."'139
Keith Aoki has clarified that in the United States of America, for
example, the Trademark Act of 1870 was regarded as unconstitutional
because trademark protection was not mentioned in Article 1 of Section 8
of the United States Constitution. However, Aoki argues that afterwards, a
recent trend has changed this view and considers trademarks "as property-
equivalent" and trademarks proprietors are considered "quasi-authors" and
thus amenable to justification in accordance with Article 1 of Section 8 of
the Constitution. 140
The utilitarian argument provides that trademarks should be accorded
protection on the basis that such protection shall result in the maximizing of
wealth. The main idea is that more protection and enforcement of trademark
legislations will lead to reducing wealth to its optimal levels, "[t]hus, wealth
is optimized, or at least increased, by granting" trademark monopolies. 141
Utilitarian theorists start their argument by studying the benefits and
advantages of protecting intellectual creations and trademarks as the basis
for justifying their protection and existence. They emphasize the fact that
the economic role such creations play is the grounds for the existence of
systems protecting them.
The first and most considered benefit of trademarks is that brand
names reduce consumers' search costs. 142 This is a rationale because
trademarks "facilitate and enhance consumer decisions" 143 in choosing the
product they wish to consume. Consumers will be able to identify the
product bearing the mark and distinguish it from amongst other products of
the same class of goods. 144 In this sense, and in future purchases, customers
139 Id.
140 Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors, and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property
and the Public Domain Part 2, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 191, 235-236 (1993-1994)
(arguing that "trademarks owners have been reconceived as quasi-authors, who by creating a
set of meanings in the minds of consumers, are rewarded judicial recognition of increasingly
exclusive rights to prevent others from 'misappropriating' this quasi-property.").
141 N. Stephan Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property, 15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 11
(2001), available at
http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/l5_2/15_2_1.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2006).
142 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270 (1988). See also Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark,
99 YALE L.J. 759, 762 (1989-1990).
143 Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523,
526 (1988).
144 Carter, supra note 142, at 762 (arguing "If goods were not marked, potential
purchasers, unable to rely on any brand name.., or distinctive appearance of the packaging.
. to identify the producer, would need a means of testing the products directly.").
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will be able to recognize the good they require without being obliged to
differentiate between the products and trying to stipulate which product
identifies and fulfills their needs and preferences. For example, a consumer
who wishes to purchase NESCAFE coffee in particular, not any other
brand, will be able to distinguish NESCAFE from a quick look over the
trademark affixed on it. Without the affixed tradmark he/she will not be
able to predict which bottle contains the NESCAFE coffee for which he/she
is seeking.145 Trademarks are used by a producer "to identify [their] goods
and distinguish them from those manufactured and sold by others."
' 146
As an important number of producers, from a utilitarian perspective,
depend on repeated purchases by their regular customers, trademarks serve
to facilitate the identification of a product. This is because a trademark "is
easier to recognise and remember; and it is often easier to physically mark
on the goods themselves rather provide the producer's full name and
address." 147 In particular, consumers do not usually know or recall the full
name and address of the producer; rather, they only recall the mark itself.
A second benefit of trademarks, from this theory's perspective, is that
it plays "an unusual ancillary social benefit," 148 according to which, "[a]n
entirely different benefit of trademark protection derives from the
incentives that such protection creates to invest resources ... in inventing
new words." 149 Trademarks enrich the language and improve it in various
of ways; first, trademarks increase the stock of works used in everyday life
by inventing totally new words that were not used before resulting in
"economizing on communication and information costs." 150 Moreover,
trademarks could turn, in certain circumstances, into generic words used by
people to identify the whole class of goods, and "represent the name of a
category of products"'15 1 rather than identifying a certain product produced
by a certain firm. 152 Finally, it is claimed that trademarks "enrich the
145 See also Landes & Posner, supra note 142, at 270 (providing a similar example of a
consumer who prefers decaffeinated coffee bearing the brand name SANKA, which is
manufactured and produced by General Foods, and arguing that it would be easier for the
consumer to ask for "SANKA coffee" rather than asking for "the decaffeinated coffee made
by General Foods.".).
146 Economides, supra note 143, at 524.
147 D. M. HIGGINS & T. J. JAMES, THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF TRADE MARKS IN THE
UK (1973-1992) A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION 4 (1996).
148 Fisher, supra note 3, at 170.
149 Landes & Posner, supra note 142, at 272-73 (providing a similar utilitarian
justification for copyrights). See also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
150 Landes & Posner, supra note 142, at 273.
151 Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary
Meaning, Genericism, Fame, Confusion and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1031
(2001). See also HIGGINS & JAMES, supra note 147, at 5.
152 A trademark becomes generic in circumstances where firms over-invest in the
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language, by creating words or phrases that people value for their intrinsic
pleasingness as well as their information value."
153
The heart of the utilitarian argument for the justification of trademark
systems focuses on the idea that "[t]he primary justifications for trademark
law are 'to facilitate and enhance consumer decisions' and 'to create
incentives for firms to produce products of desirable qualities even when
these are not observable before purchase'."' 154 If a number of guarantees
were not provided, producers of intellectual creations will be reluctant to
produce intellectual property, and particularly, imitators will free-ride such
works without baring any costs.155 "This possibility would reduce the
incentive for a successful firm to mark its goods and would thereby raise
consumer search costs."'15 6 However, as will be shown below this incentive
argument does not stand to justify trademarks.
It is argued that "[u]tilitarian theorists endorse the creation of
intellectual property rights in order to induce innovation and intellectual
productivity."' 157 Such an argument suggests that if trademarks were not
affixed to products i.e. if trademark systems did not exist, or if those
systems did exist but did not sufficiently protect trademarks, then producers
would not have the incentive to produce high quality products and would
not improve their goods or services. This is because consumers will not be
able to distinguish between the desired products and will not choose the
advertising of their trademarks and their products. Such an act results in consumers
identifying the trademark as the name for the entire class of products or industry. For
example, the trademark THERMOS became generic when consumers started to associate the
word THERMOS with all similar products. Other examples are ASPIRIN and HOOVER.
Port, supra note 65, at 597 (pointing out, "[w]hen a trademark stops denoting the source of a
product but rather the product itself, it becomes [a generic trademark].").
153 Landes & Posner, supra note 142, at 273. After the argument that was provided by
Landes and Posner regarding the benefits of trademarks, they only hold their defence for the
first benefit. Whereas, they provided that the advantages of the second benefit are small.
They argue that the goal of the language "is to minimize the sum of the costs of avoiding
misunderstanding and the costs of communicating," this goal is not satisfied by trademarks
because of the distortions that could result from them. They further argue that "we do not
need trademark protection just to be sure of having enough words." Landes and Posner
compare trademarks to patents and copyrights, and provide that "we may need patent
protection to be sure of having enough inventions, or copyright protection to be having
enough books, movies and musical compositions." See id. at 273, 275.
154 Menell, supra note 8, at 149. See also Kozinski, supra note 56, at 451 (providing that
"a utilitarian would argue for [trademark laws] with the best incentives for creative output
and wealth maximization."); See Adam D. Moore, Intellectual property, Innovation, and
Social Progress: The Case Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 601,
607 (2003) (arguing that the utilitarian theory is based upon the premise that granting control
to creators of intellectual creations "provides incentives necessary for social progress," and
the aim of this theory is to "maximize social utility.").
155 Moore, supra note 154, at 611.
156 Carter, supra note 142, at 763.
157 Zemer, supra note 9, at 57.
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product they require. 158 Trademark systems encourage firms to invest in
developing new words or symbols, by "eliminating the risk that competitors
will free-ride upon such investments." 159 If someone has products or
services of high and superior quality, he/she will be deterred from putting
his/her products or services in the market, because that lack of trademark
protection will make him/her unable to inform consumers of the qualities of
such products or services. 160
According to the utilitarian justification "promoting the creation of
valuable intellectual works requires that intellectual laborers be granted
property rights in those works, [without which] adequate incentives for the
creation of a socially optimal output of intellectual products would not
exist."' 161 Thus, property rights are granted to intellectual creators "not
because they deserve such rights or have mixed their labor in an appropriate
way, but because this is the only way to ensure that an optimal amount of
intellectual products will be available for society."' 162
The economic justification of trademarks does not recognize the rights
of the trademark proprietor only, utilitarian theorists argue. They claim that,
subject to economic terms, the impact of the protection of a trademark
owner's rights would result in the benefit and good for the society as a
whole and for others; otherwise trademarks protection should not exist. This
is because "[tihe key concept of the economic theory of property rights is
that of externality. An externality is an economic situation in which an
individual's pursuit of his self-interest has spillover effects on the utility or
welfare of others." 163
In this sense, utilitarian theorists try to draw a balance between the
trademark owner's economic rights and the interests of the consuming
public. 164 Fisher points out that the utilitarian argument should be construed
158 Moreover, it could also be argued -from the economic perspective- that if the lack of
trademarks protection existed, producers will be reluctant to create new words or symbols to
be used over their products or services, because such words and symbols would be available
for rivals to free ride. If a new word or symbol which was created by a firm or a producer is
freely appropriable for all rivals then the incentive of creating trademarks will not exist.
159 Menell, supra note 8, at 149.
160 W.R. Cornish & Jennifer Phillips, The Economic Function of Trade Marks: An
Analysis with Special Reference to Developing Countries, 13 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
COPYRIGHT L. 41, 46 (1982).
161 Hettinger, supra note 18, at 47-48.
162 Moore, supra note 154, at 612.
163 Spector, supra note 17, at 271 (arguing that "externality could be either negative or
positive. And by applying trademarks over his argument, one may conclude that trademarks
should enjoy protection if such protection is not only in favour of its proprietor, but also in
the benefit of the society, and this is the positive externality. Whereas if the trademark
protection would result in harmful effects due to its owner's exploitation, then such
protection should be prevented, and this is the notion of negative externality).
164 Zemer, supra note 9, at 57.
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as the beacon for "the maximization of net social welfare." 165 He argues
that to achieve this goal, a balance should be drawn on the one hand
between the powers and entitlements granted to trademarks proprietors in
order to stimulate the creation of trademarks and to ensure consistent
quality control over goods or services, and on the other hand "the partially
offsetting tendency of such rights to curtail widespread public enjoyment of
those creations."' 166 However, it shall be argued that this theory fails to
draw the balance that it alleges, because "the utility gains from increased
incentives ... must be weighed against the utility losses incurred from
monopolization."1 67
Landes and Posner suggest a model based on economic premises for
the justification of trademarks. They define the "full price" of a good or
service which is the money price of the good or service plus "the search
costs incurred by the buyer in obtaining information about the relevant
attributes of the good"'168 or service. According to them, the more a
trademark reduces consumers' search costs through providing more
information, the more a producer may raise the price of his/her product
without exceeding the "full price" which the customer is willing to pay for
the good or service. They argue that "[t]he more resources the firm spends
developing and promoting its mark, the stronger will its mark be and the
lower, therefore, consumer search costs will be; so the firm will be able to
charge a higher price." 169
According to Nicholas Economides, products have some features
which are unobservable. Economides argues that trademarks simply play
the economic role of helping and assisting consumers to identify those
features. Such identification could not be achieved without trademarks, and
the absence of trademark systems in the light of the fact that consumers will
have the choice with other identical goods will result in a number of
disadvantages. 170
Economides argues that in the absence of trademarks "the consumer
will only by chance pick the one with the desirable unobservable
qualities."' 171 Moreover, producers will not invest in improving their
165 Fisher, supra note 3, at 169.
166 Id.
167 Palmer, supra note 82, at 849.
168 Landes & Posner, supra note 142, at 277.
169 Id. See id at 279 (providing a hypothetical example based on the assumption that all
producers produce goods of identical quality but with differing prices. This difference in
price is due to the difference of the strength of the trademarks "not because of any quality
differences in the underlying physical product." This shows how trademarks are justifiable
upon economic terms.).
170 Economides, supra note 143, at 526.
171 Id.
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products or services; they "would produce products with the cheapest
possible unobservable qualities, because high levels of unobservable
qualities would not add to a firm's ability to sell at a higher price."'
72
Economides concludes that a number of aspects participate in the
success of trademarks. The ability of consumers to memorize and recall the
trademark, and the inability of other rivals to use similar or identical
trademarks, shall all ensure the efficiency of trademark systems.
173
Economides argues that this economic background legitimizes and
presupposes the existence of trademarks. Landes and Posner also agree with
this argument, and stress that trademarks should not be duplicated to
achieve their goals. 1
74
B. Criticism to the utility and economic model
Although many scholars regard the utilitarian argument as an ideal
theory to justify the existence of trademark systems, it is clear that a
number of problems face the utilitarian justification. The rationale upon
which this argument is based is unattainable. Moreover, economic theory
cannot stand alone in justifying trademarks. The inadequacies in this theory
are manifold, starting from the wealth maximization, incentive and quality
products arguments, etc. Those arguments lead to artificial results because
their underlying arguments are not solid as to whether to justify or
legitimize entitlement over a trademark. It relies upon the economic results
emerging from the protection of trademarks, which is not capable of the
justification thereof. The artificialness of the utilitarian argument derives
from the fact that one could not bring economic and utility terms into legal
theory. A theory that justifies trademarks should find a real ground to
legitimize the existence of trademarks rights, and to seek justice in granting
the rights and imposing obligations amongst the parties in a trademark
formula. For example, the presumption that trademarks protection shall
provide incentive to producers is subject to economic and market
considerations, but not a ground to justify why trademarks should exist.
The economic theory presupposes that providing efficient systems for
the protection of trademarks shall result in maximizing the wealth to its
optimal levels. This argument could appear intuitive. However, it is also
another manifestation of the artificialness of this theory, thus the question
of crucial importance is to determine to whom wealth is maximized. I
believe the current trend in trademark legislations is in favor of trademarks
proprietors. They are the party holding advantages and their wealth is
172 Id.
173 Id. at 526-27.
174 Landes & Posner, supra note 142, at 270.
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maximized. It is apparent that this is the result of the main problem that lies
within the utilitarian theory, which is, unlike the claim of utilitarian
theorists, that the economic theory does not draw a balance between the
trademark owner's interests on the one hand, and those of the consuming
public on the other. Thus, "[s]triking an appropriate balance between
private and public ... cannot be fully realised under the auspices of
utilitarian justification." 175
Moreover, it is a matter of question whether the policy of legislations
should aim to maximize wealth or to achieve certain utility ends or
achievements. I believe that a trademark system should not aim to
maximize wealth. Rather, policy makers should strike to provide a fair legal
system assuring justice to all involved parties in the trademark formula.
After all, "[w]ealth maximization is not the goal of law; rather, the goal is
justice- giving each man his due." 176 Even if trademarks do result in
maximizing wealth, this does not justify "the unethical violation of some
individuals' rights to use their own property as they see fit."' 177
The incentive rationale in this theory is divided into two arguments:
the incentive to invest in a trademark and undertaking a business, and the
incentive to produce quality products.
As regards the former, this economic-incentive argument is brought to
this theory because its premises are based on an economic perspective,
which is subject to economic terms, and this has totally nothing to do with
legal theory. The incentive to use a trademark is based solely on the
economics of the market, and whether someone has the incentive to
undertake a business is something based on individual case and upon
market rules. This is apparently distinct from any justification of law. In
opposition to this incentive rationale, Keith Aoki considers the incentive
argument as ridiculous, and argues that "the need [of trademark owners] to
differentiate their product from others provides sufficient incentive to
develop striking and attractive denotative marks."' 17
8
However, if one could ignore this fact for the sake of argument, then
still this incentive argument could not help to justify trademarks. The
argument focuses on the trademark owner, not only ignoring the consuming
public's role in trademarks formula, but also depriving them of their rights
in the trademark. This argument suggests that incentive should be enhanced
to trademark owners and in doing so and to provide the necessary incentive,
trademark systems should protect the aspects that the public most values
175 Zemer, supra note 9, at 60.
176 Kinsella, supra note 141, at 12.
177 Id.
178 Aoki, supra note 140, at 241.
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and appreciates. 179 This is an infringement to the public's rights, as if they
were passive in the trademarks context. Moreover, the benefits of
undertaking a business and achieving financial gain and profits is the real
incentive for traders; this is, as mentioned above, subject to market strategy
and economic terms. It is questionable whether "the production of specific
sorts of intellectual products depend upon" trademark protection and the
incentives they provide. However, "[o]ther monetary or nonmonetary
rewards.., would be sufficient to sustain current levels of production even
in the absence of intellectual-property protection." 180
A number of scholars support this argument against the incentive
rational. Tom Palmer totally opposes the economic theory and argues that
there is no strong evidence that intellectual property rights provide an
incentive or actually "result in an increase in innovation and creativity."' 18
1
Stephen Carter also argues that "[t]rademark law ... provides no incentive
to create new marks." 182 He distinguishes between trademarks on the one
hand and copyrights and patents on the other hand, and asserts that "[o]ne
might conceive of an optimal supply of copyrighted works or patented
inventions, but it makes no sense to refer to an optimal supply of marks as
such."183
The second incentive argument, the incentive to produce quality
products, imposes another kind of hurdles. It seems that the majority of the
utilitarian argument focuses on an alleged fact; that trademarks provide the
incentive for producers to produce products with high quality and to
preserve this quality. 184 This "quality argument" finds its roots in Frank
Schechter's argument. In his famous 1927 article, Schechter argued that
trademarks no longer function as source or origin identifiers, rather "the
true functions of the trademark are ... to identify a product as satisfactory;"
thus a trademark is the resemblance of quality.' 85
179 Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMoRY L.J. 965, 997 (1990).
180 Fisher, supra note 3, at 180. Edwin Hettinger also opposes the utilitarian based
justification; he argues that it is not evident that intellectual property systems increase the
availability of intellectual works. See Hettinger, supra note 18, at 49.
181 Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics
Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 266, 300 (1988-1989).
182 Carter, supra note 142, at 768.
183 Id.
184 Landes & Posner, supra note 142, at 271 (arguing that trademarks "are valuable
because they denote consistent quality."). The quality assurance argument could be also
found in Economides' argument. See Economides, supra note 143, at 525 (stating
trademarks "encourage firms to maintain consistent quality."); Spector, supra note 17, at 272
(pointing out that the economic theory aims to provide "qualitative improvement of the
production of material goods and services."); see also HIGGINS & JAMES, supra note 147, at
4-5.
185 Frank 1. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 60 TRADEMARK REP.
334, 337 (Reprinted in 1970). The functions of trademarks will be the subject of further
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As regards this claim, that trademark systems provide incentives for
firms and producers to produce products or services of high quality, I
believe that this argument is not convincing for a number of reasons.
186
First, because the practice in the field of trademarks shows that even though
trademark systems exist, not all firms and producers are producing goods
and/or services of high quality. This is because it is a relative issue that
differs from one producer to another according to economic and market
considerations. Second, even utilitarian scholars were confused regarding
this quality assurance argument; some utilitarian theorists clearly argue that
the function of trademarks is the quality resemblance, such as Landes and
Posner. Others were less clear regarding this issue. Nicholas Economides
for example, argues that trademarks are a means to identify and distinguish
the source of the products or services. At the same time he argues that
trademarks identify the quality of the product.187 It is apparent that there is
some confusion in this regard amongst utilitarian theorists. However, the
incentive for producing quality products after all is a result, and a result
could not justify the whole system of trademarks. Moreover, quality is a
relative matter, and its assessment is different amongst consumers.
C. Consumer search cost and trademarks justification
The opposition to the utilitarian theory does not mean that trademarks
are not amenable to economic considerations. Rather, I believe that
trademarks are justifiable according to the utilitarian theory, but this theory
is not enough for the justification of the trademark system because partial
aspect of this theory is reliable for this purpose. However, such ground is
not exhaustive and could not be sufficient solely to justify trademarks
because this theory fails to provide a limit to the proprietor's rights, and it
does not draw a balance between the proprietor's rights and the public's
rights. This is why this theory could not be exhaustive for trademarks
justification. It needs another theoretical framework to provide limits and
boundaries of the parties and to draw the required balance.
Trademarks, in fact, do reduce consumer search costs, and this is an
important aspect thereof. Trademarks are indeed means for consumers to
differentiate goods and services of one undertaker from those of others,
without which consumers will not be able to choose the goods and services
of their preferences.
However, it is essential to define "consumer search cost" in order to
discussion.
186 This argument is driven from Frank Schechter's argument, which stress that
trademark functions as quality tools, and are no longer a source or origin identifier, and are
as such amenable to further and more protection.
187 Economides, supra note 143, at 524, 527.
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understand how its reduction could be the basis for trademarks justification.
In order to achieve this goal, one should imagine a world without
trademarks. In this case, the consuming public would be unable to choose
the articles they need to consume, because they would be unable to identify
the products from amongst each other. 188 This leads us to the fact that
trademarks provide the consumer with the information necessary to make
the decision of purchase.189 Indeed, "[a] trademark is a convenient way of
giving the person searching in the market a great deal of information in a
very small package. Trademarks are protected because they lower consumer
search costs, enabling people to make quicker, cheaper decisions about
what they want to buy."'19
0
A cheaper decision is a decision which could be based on a trademark,
because this mark makes the unobservable features and those of personal
preference more clear, and thus consumers are able to make this decision
without bearing huge efforts, which shall save time and resources.] 91
However, it should be borne in mind that the fact that trademarks do
reduce and lower consumers' search costs should not be related to any other
economic considerations because legal theory could not be based upon
economic terms. As have been argued, economic rationales are artificial in
the context of the justification and theory of trademarks. Thus, unlike the
argument of utilitarian scholars, 192 one could not use the fact of the
reduction of consumer search cost to conclude that this creates incentives to
producers. Utilitarian scholarship seeks to assert such a connection but fails
to justify any link between search costs and the incentive presumption.
Moreover, this does not mean that the owner of a trademark can impose
higher prices for his/her products because this trademark does lower
188 C. D. G. PICKERING, TRADE MARKS N THEORY AND PRACTICE 88 (1st ed. 1998).
189 See Landes & Posner, supra note 142, at 277-78 (The information that a trademark
provides to the consumer is manifested in identifying the origin and/or source of the goods
and/or services, but not the quality as most utilitarian scholars argue. Those functions of
trademarks shall be the subject of further discussion. Landes and Posner argue two kinds of
information can be afforded by trademarks. The first is the information which "enables the
consumer to identify the source of the good ... [economizing] on search costs by lowering
the cost of selecting goods on the basis of past experience or the recommendation of other
consumers." The second is the "information about the product itself' which shall also lower
search costs.).
190 Carter, supra note 43, at 105.
191 PICKERING, supra note 188, at 88.
192 Scholars argue that due to the fact that trademarks lower consumers search costs, this
creates an incentive for consumers to produce goods or services with a certain amount of
quality. Thus, "[t]rademark protection encourages the development of branding and
distinctive products. Without trademark protection, companies might lack the incentive to
produce quality goods, limiting commercial intercourse." Zemer, supra note 9, at 58. See
also Landes & Posner, supra note 142, at 279 (arguing that "an important and widely
recognized benefit of trademarks is that they give firms an incentive to improve the quality
of their products.").
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consumer search costs. 193 This is due to the fact that lowering consumer
search costs is the basis for justifying a trademark system, not an economic
ground to increase the article's price. Indeed, "the purpose of trademark law
is not ... to provide an incentive for the creation of new and better
trademarks. Rather,... trademark law seeks to protect consumers by
allowing product - and producer - differentiation that reduces the risk of
consumer confusion and lowers search costs."
' 194
Nevertheless, the problem with this theory is that it does not provide a
limit for the protection accorded for trademarks. According to
utilitarianism, the more trademarks reduce consumer search costs the more
they are worthy of protection. This reaches to the conclusion that the
protection of trademarks, if solely justified upon utilitarianism, could result
in unethical and illegitimate monopolies in the hands of trademarks
proprietors. This will not achieve the balance which utilitarian theorists
seek and claim that this theory achieves. This leads to the important
disadvantage of adhering to the utilitarian theory; according to which, no
limitations are stipulated upon the rights granted to trademarks owners,
resulting in extreme control over their trademarks which would be harmful
to fair competition.
In conclusion, the utilitarian and economic theory could not be an
exhaustive theoretical framework upon which trademark systems could be
justified. Major aspects of this theory do not stand for this purpose.
Artificial arguments which are in fact pure economic aspects are brought by
this theory and are not familiar with legal theory. However, as argued
earlier, partial argument in this theory is useful in trademarks justification,
which is the consumer search cost rationale. However, if this ground is
taken solely, the result will be the extreme maximization of the trademark
owner's rights, and totally ignoring the public's rights whose rights are vital
in the trademark equation. Thus, there should be another prospective to
limit the utility and economic theory, and its conjunction with the economic
theory could lead to the proper justification for trademark systems. Because
this economic theory fails to provide a balance between the trademark
owner's rights and the rights of the public, it could not solely stand to
justify trademark systems. From this point, the next section tackles the
Social-Planning theory and how it could be the ideal framework to provide
the boundaries for trademarks protection, and the appropriate balance
between the involved parties.
193 Such as the model suggested by Landes and Posner. See supra text accompanying
notes 168-69.
194 Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1474, 1488-89
(2004).
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V.
THE SOCIAL-PLANNING APPROACH
[Tihe consumption of commodified representational forms is
productive activity in which people engage in meaning-making to adapt
signs, texts, and images to their own agendas. These practices of
appropriation or "recoding" cultural forms are the essence of popular
culture. 
195
The last, and newest theory to justify trademark systems, is the Social-
Planning theory. The naming of this theory was not a matter of consensus
among scholars. For example, some suggest that the "Social-Planning
Theory" could be the ideal labelling for this theory. 19 6 Others suggest
"Social and Institutional Planning". 197 However, I will call this theory "The
Social-Planning Theory" because this title reflects the adherence of this
theory to the public role in the creation of trademarks and the need of the
society to the expressive use of cultural signs and symbols.
Although the Social-Planning theory is "less well known than the
other [approaches],"' 98 it "is similar to utilitarianism in its teleological
orientation,"'1 9 9 but still differs from the other approaches justifying
intellectual property and trademark systems. This theory is dissimilar to
utilitarianism "in its willingness to deploy visions of a desirable society
richer than the conceptions of 'social welfare' deployed by utilitarians."200
It also differs from the perspective from which it justifies trademark
systems, in terms of its recognition of the public as an important factor in
the trademarks formula. This theory is the most important in justifying
trademarks and vital to providing a balance between the rights conferred
upon the proprietor of the mark on the one hand, and the consuming public
on the other. It also considers that the monopolistic nature of trademark
rights shall have adverse effects upon free and fair competition, and thus, it
recognizes the rights of other traders and rivals.
20 1
Trademark owners do indeed work and labor on the creation of their
marks. They also invest a large amount of effort in providing positive
connotations in the minds of consumers. In today's era, the availability of
195 Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual
Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1863-64 (1990-1991).
196 Fisher, supra note 3, at 174.
197 Zemer, supra note 9, at 65.
198 Fisher, supra note 88, at 1214.
199 Fisher, supra note 3, at 173.
200 Id.
201 In its recognition of the rights of other traders, this theory stresses on a number of
doctrines which shall de-monopolize trademark rights, such as the cancellation for non-use
of trademarks concept, honest concurrent doctrine, etc.
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mass media channels plays an important role in creating positive
connotations with trademarks. The spread of advertising means enabling
trademark owners to preserve and reinforce the image of their marks in the
eyes and minds of their potential consumers. However, this theory focuses
on the reaction of the consuming public, and whether this reaction has any
effect upon the legitimacy and the justification of trademark systems, and
whether the public's association of the mark with certain means shall have
any effect. It is also crucial to assess the cultural role of trademarks and its
implication on the free will of the public, as well as the public's right to
fully express itself through social commentary.
When first enacted, trademark legislations provided a protection for
different purposes than those existing now. 20 2 Trademarks were, in the first
place, formulated to protect the consumer from any potential confusion as
to the source or origin of goods and/or services, and ultimately to preserve
the interests of the consuming public. However, today the protection is
widened to the extent that trademarks protection could be harmful to the
consuming public and in favor of trademark proprietors. This shall result in
cultural distortion because depriving the public from using trademarks to
express itself shall result in adverse effects over the culture. Trademarks
"may deprive us of the optimal cultural conditions for dialogic practice."203
They could also "be used to prohibit access to, and use of, many cultural
forms." 204 Moreover,
[o]ur intangible assets are indeed valuable, but an overbroad grant of
monopoly rights to prior creators may retard the development of new
intellectual products and sometimes may interfere impermissibly with the
autonomy of others and with efforts by individuals to achieve cultural self-
determination[,] ... impair[ing] our culture's ability to respond flexibly to
future opportunities and dangers. 20 5
Indeed, such an exaggeration of protection in favor of the trademarks
owners shall deprive the consuming public of some fundamental rights. For
202 Unlike copyrights and patents, trademark systems were not designed to provide an
incentive in the way described in Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. They were formulated
to prevent consumer confusion and protect them in the first place. However, the current trend
has diverted from the right track and granted full regard to the trademark owner and his/her
interests.
203 Coombe, supra note 195, at 1866. See ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 42 (1998) (arguing that "[i]n the current climate, intellectual
property laws often operate to stifle dialogic practice in the public sphere, preventing us
from using the most powerful, prevalent, and accessible cultural forms to express alternative
visions of social worlds.").
204 Jason J. Bosland, The Culture of Trade Marks: An Alternative Cultural Theory
Perspective, 10 MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 99, 100 (2005), available at http://www.ipria.org/
publications/workingpapers/WP I 3.05.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
205 Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 157 (1992).
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example, the right of freedom of speech will be violated.2 °6 The extension
of trademark protection shall have deep implications over the public's right
over trademarks because this will put all the rights under the disposal of the
trademark owner preventing the public from using it for expressive and
cultural purposes. And "[i]f investment is dispositive of the trademark
owner's right to control, then the public's ability to evoke the expressive
dimension of marks is in danger of significant restriction.
'
"
20 7
Thus, it is important to discuss the arguments underlying this theory;
that trademarks are cultural and expressive tools, and that the public
contribute in the creation of trademarks. Then, a proposed rationale for this
theory shall be argued, in order to suggest an ideal framework for this
approach.
A. Cultural and expressive use of trademarks
The premise underlying this theory is that trademarks no longer play
the conventional role they used to in the past. Trademarks are a means of
cultural communication between individuals, enabling them to express
themselves freely and deliver their messages through the world around
them. The public uses trademarks and associates certain meanings of
preferences or disgrace. Trademarks "can develop into fertile sources of
collective popular culture ... by which individuals identify, translate,
interpret, and critique the world around them." 20 8 This means that
trademarks are not quality assurance tools, and not only a source identifier,
but more importantly, a way of expressing one's self in a cultural
context. 20 9 This shall enrich the cultural diversity through the imaginary
meanings which the public attribute to signs and symbols. The Social-
Planning theory "is largely devoted to discussing ways to maintain a strong
civic culture that benefits from a reasonably balanced social and
institutional intellectual property regime."210
206 This fight embodies a number of sub-rights such as the right of parody, satire and
social criticism, etc. See Robert J. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First
Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1107-12 (1986).
207 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405 (1990).
208 Bosland, supra note 204, at 101. See also Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams of Itself
to be American: Reflections on the Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark
Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523, 528 (1997) (arguing that
"[iun today's societies, symbols that once functioned simply to indicate the source, origin,
and quality of goods, have become products valued as indicators of the 'status, preferences,
and aspirations of those who use them. Some trademarks have worked their way into the
English language; others provide bases for vibrant, evocative metaphors'.").
209 Aoki, supra note 208, at 544 (pointing out that "ownership in text displaces the ability
of individuals to engage in the creation of self and cultural identity.").
210 Zemer, supra note 9, at 65.
Vol 5:1
Fall 2007
A proper interpretation in the justification provided by the Social-
Planning theory presumes that trademarks function as source and origin
identifiers. This should be regarded as the primary function thereof, and it
also refuses the argument that trademarks are quality identifiers, as argued
by the utilitarian and economic theory. However, this should coexist with
the emphasis of this theory on protecting the consuming public in this
context.
Trademarks are not only important in reducing consumer search costs
and helping consumers to choose the products they require. The Social-
Planning theory suggests that trademarks also are culturally "vitally
important" 2 1 1 for protecting "our social interests in freedom of speech,
[and] promoting expressive activity." 2 12 This theory lies "in the proposition
that property right should be shaped so as to help foster the achievement of
a just and attractive culture." 2 13 In this attractive society, "all persons would
be able to participate in the process of making cultural meaning. Instead of
being merely passive consumers of images and artifacts produced by others,
they would help shape the world of ideas and symbols in which they
live." 2
14
This goal is achieved by recognizing the public's role, and hence,
allowing them to use trademarks in the cultural context. Keith Aoki argues
that textual symbols play a significant role in "both cultural and personal
identity." 2 15 He provides an example to illustrate this idea; the Harley-
Davidson trademark. 2 16 This mark was first used to symbolize personal
freedom, but afterwards it was used by private entities to distinguish their
products. Aoki clarifies that "[w]hile Harley-Davidson can generally be
understood to represent personal freedom, within the Harley-Davidson
subculture discrete groups interpret the core set of values associated with
Harley-Davidson so as to render them consistent with their 'prevailing life
structures'. "217
Another example of this was provided by Aoki - a graphic designe
group from Sarajevo named Trio used a number of postcards and depicted
some western trademarks "to convey their demand for the return of their
211 Bosland, supra note 204, at 1.
212 COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES, supra note 203, at 54.
213 Fisher, supra note 88, at 1214; see also Fisher, supra note 3, at 172.
214 Fisher, supra note 3, at 193.
215 Aoki, supra note 208, at 527.
216 This mark consists of a "spread-winged eagle." Id.
217 Id. at 528. As this part of the study is not tackling well known trademarks, and
although the Harley-Davidson trademark is considered famous and well known, this example
was driven to illustrate the way in which the meaning of a trademark could be transformed,
and the role consumers play in this transformation. It also clarifies how trademarks are an
important factor in the public's culture.
BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL
most fundamental human right, the right to exist." 218 Such examples
illustrate how trademarks are no longer a means used in trade to perform
certain functions. The public use trademarks in different social context to
express their ideas, fears, thoughts, etc... Trademarks have become tools to
convey messages to the public.
Coombe, a significant social theorist, starts her argument by defending
the social approach to intellectual property in general, and to trademarks in
particular, by discussing the difference between the objective world and the
subjective self. According to her, "the objective world is the cultural
construction of social subjects and that subjectivity itself is a product of
language and cultural practice, . . . [and] ... [w]hat we experience as social
reality is a constellation of cultural structures that we ourselves construct
and transform in ongoing practice." 2
19
For Coombe, "mass media imagery and commodified cultural texts
provide the most important cultural resources for the articulation of identity
and community in western societies." 220 However, Coombe's concern and
fear are that "objectifying and reifying cultural forms" shall result in
"freezing the connotations of signs and symbols and fencing off fields of
cultural meaning[s]." '221 Thus trademarks laws shall restrict "certain forms
of political practice[s], ''222 in particular the right of freedom of speech. This
right is protected in the United Kingdom under Article 12 of the Human
Rights Act, 223 and in the United States of America under the First
Amendment. 224 As one scholar has argued, "the essence of the first
amendment claim is that there are instances in which the loss of vocabulary
is, effectively, the loss of the ability to communicate. '" 225
An instructive example which is brought by the majority of the social
theory literature226 is the Gay Olympic case. In this case, a Californian non-
profit gay advocacy group called San Francisco Arts and Athletics Inc.
(SFAA) intended to promote an Olympic games for gays, under the name
"Gay Olympic Games." However, under the United States Amateur Sports
Act of 1978, the use of the word "Olympic" is restricted to the United
218 Id. at 541.
219 Coombe, supra note 195, at 1858.
220 Id. at 1864.
221 Id. at 1866.
222 Id.
223 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 12 (Eng.).
224 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
225 Dreyfuss, supra note 207, at 412.
226 Coombe, supra note 195, at 1874-76; see also TONY MARTINO, TRADEMARK DILUTION
63 (1996); Aoki, supra note 208, at 539-40; Bosland, supra note 204, at 6; Dreyfuss, supra
note 207, at 398-99, 404-05; Marla J. Kaplan, Antidilution Statutes and the First
Amendment, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1139, 1145-46 (1992).
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States Olympic Committee (USOC), and it is the only party to use this mark
and to enable and authorize other parties or entities to its use. The Act also
entitles USOC to prohibit others from using the Olympic mark, whether
such use is likely to cause confusion or not.227 USOC filed a case
requesting that SFAA refrain from using the Olympic mark. SFAA alleged
that its use of this mark falls under the ambit of the first amendment, and
thus, could not be prohibited 228 because the aim of this game was "to
promote the acceptance and profile of the gay community," 229 and to
"convey a political statement about the status of homosexuals in
society." 230 The court rejected the SFAA claim and ruled that the
prohibition of the use of the mark Olympic did not prohibit SFAA from
conveying its message. 231 The court stressed USOC's rights because
[the] use of the word by other entities to promote an athletic event
would directly impinge on the USOC's legitimate right of exclusive use[,
and] [t]he mere fact that the SFAA claims an expressive, as opposed to a
purely commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amendment right to
appropriate [the value which the USOC's efforts have given to the
word].2 32
However, Justices Brennan and Marshall of the Court have dissented.
They argued that the court has broadened the prohibition in the Amateur
Sports Act to include non-commercial speech,233 which is unacceptable.
They have pointed out that "[b]y prohibiting use of the word 'Olympic,' the
USOC substantially infringes upon the SFAA's right to communicate
ideas" 234 and its right to deliver the message it was trying to convey.
As the court in the Olympic gay case has provided, this case is
different from regular trademark cases in a number of aspects; the Olympic
mark is not protected under trademark legislations; rather, it is protected
under a sui generis system, 235 which is the Amateur Sports Act. Moreover,
the USOC does not need to prove the existence of confusion or likelihood
227 Amateur Sports Act of 1978 § 110, 92 Stat. 3048, 36 U.S.C. § 380 (current version at
36 U.S.C.S. § 220506).
228 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
523 (1987).
229 Bosland, supra note 204, at 6.
230 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 535.
231 Id. at 536.
232 Id. at 540-41.
233 Id. at 568.
234 Id at 570. Although the court considered SFAA's acts as commercial acts, which are
subject to limited first amendment rights, Justices Brennan and Marshall considered that its
acts are not commercial. Because even if public interest groups attempt to sell some items,
this does not mean that they aim profit out of that, they merely try to "support their activities
through sales of items bearing their slogans." Dreyfuss, supra note 207, at 411.
235 Dreyfuss, supra note 207, at 404.
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of confusion. 236 However, fears exist that this judgment could be applied to
ordinary trademark cases, 237 which shall have adverse effects on the
cultural life of society at large, and deprive individuals and entities of their
essential right to express themselves through democratic dialogue. As one
scholar has pointed out, the judgment of this court "puts in jeopardy the
public's ability to avail itself of the powerful rhetorical capacity of
trademarks. '" 238
The Gay Olympic case also demonstrates another social significance
of trademarks. They are socially important for democratic dialogue amongst
individuals, as people are using them in their communication, because
"dialogue is always already our state of being and consciousness." 239 A
telling example has been provided by one scholar; where two children from
two different social and cultural backgrounds have met, one of them tries to
communicate with the other by saying "Ninja, Ninja, Ninja Turtles,"
waiting for the reaction from the other child, but he/she did not respond
because his/her parents were restricting their child's watching of television.
Hence, the communication between the two of them failed because of the
lack of communicative tools.2
40
The case in trademarks is different from other intellectual property
systems. A trademark's value has developed in such a way that it becomes a
product in its own right and as such, trademarks are "consumed as products
themselves." 241 Furthermore, as Coombe correctly remarks, "in many
sectors of the economy, texts deployed to market goods may be more
valuable than the physical assets necessary to create the product."
242
However, in other intellectual property systems, the owner of the work of
intellect is only remunerated though the selling of his work, and hence the
exclusivity of the rights to the owner is vital. On the other hand, in the case
of trademarks, the owner is remunerated by several means, for instance, the
selling power of the mark and the profits of selling the article itself. The
exclusivity in favor of the trademark owner is only necessary to identify the
source of the products and/or services. As long as the trademark identifies
the source function, there is no harm to the trademark owner from the
public's expressive use of the mark in the social cultural context,
243
236 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 53 1.
237 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 207, at 404 (arguing that the outcome resulting from
the court's decision "will surely be transformed to trademark claims.").
238 Id. at 398.
239 COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES, supra note 203, at 47.
240 Id. at 53.
241 Bosland, supra note 204, at 101.
242 The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties (n203) 56.
243 See Dreyfuss, supra note 207, at 408 (arguing that in other intellectual property
systems the "law protects the one and only product that the creator has for sale," but in
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especially since that developing new words to substitute the expressive use
of the mark is a long and complicated process. 244 Concluding that the
cultural and expressive use of the mark does not affect nor deprive the
owner from his/her proprietary rights, rather it strikes a balance between
him/her and the public.
B. Trademarks' creation and the public role
The way in which trademarks are formulated is not limited to the
proprietor's intellectual labor and the fixing of the mark over the products.
The failure of other theoretical justifications to take account of the
collective nature of trademarks is an important barrier against their
applicability to trademarks. 245 A point of major importance, which all other
approaches ignore and fail to address, is the role the consuming public plays
in the meaning-making of the trademark. As one scholar has argued,
"[m]eaning is... given to trademarks by the endless stream of possible
interpretations imposed by the audience/consumer/reader." 246
In the same sense, while discussing the author in the context of
copyright, Ronald Barthes argues that the author of a work "is always
conceived of as the past of his own book[,... however t]he reader is the
space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed
without any of them being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its
destination." 247 By analogy, in the field of trademarks, Barthes' argument
could be construed in the sense that the meaning of a trademark is not
constituted by its owner, but rather though its destination - the public at
large. This is evident in the way a trademark becomes a generic mark,
which is due to the kind of recognition the consuming public attribute to the
mark. The association of the mark with a certain kind or class of products
renders the mark generic. The same applies to the secondary meaning
doctrine, according to which the public's recognition of the mark as a mark
identifying the products and/or services of a certain undertaker or
manufacturer could make such marks registrable, even though it was not
eligible for registration. Those examples clarify the role of the consuming
public in the meaning-making of trademarks.
In his seminal work, Steven Wilf tries to provide an answer to the title
of his article, "Who Authors Trademarks?". Wilf has developed what he
trademarks the owner "is really in the business of selling ... different product[s].").
244 Id. at 416.
245 For example, Locke's labour theory did not recognize the collective nature of
trademarks, "and this is ... the greatest difficult[y] in applying [his treatise] to intellectual
property." Zemer, supra note 48, at 918.
246 Bosland, supra note 204, at 7.
247 ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE - MUSIC - TEXT 145, 148
(Steven Heath trans., Fontana Press 1977).
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calls the "Public Authorship Model." This model admits the role of the
trademark owners, but argues that the public contributes in the creation of
the trademark and is entitled to joint ownership of the mark with its
proprietor.248 As a practical model, Wilf argues that his model focuses on
the often ignored role of the public in creating trademarks. He argues that "a
trademark is a creature of symbolic language. Like any other symbol or
text, trademarks do not simply appear out of whole cloth. They are
authored."'249 According to Wilf, it is us - the public - who author
trademarks. 2
50
In order to legitimize trademark systems, we should first understand
the manner according to which trademarks are created. The trademark
owner either uses an existing word or sign, or he/she develops a new one.
After the trademark is affixed and associated with the article and is put into
circulation, the public grants this mark the meaning it finds appropriate.
This meaning is based upon the consumers' consensus, through their
purchasing habits. As this article tackles ordinary trademarks, as distinct
from well known trademarks, it should be noted that the amount of
recognition and meaning attributed to the ordinary trademark could be very
minor or minimal, and still the public shall enjoy property rights in the
mark as co-authors. This is because the public decided to grant the mark
little or no recognition, and by this negative act of not granting any
recognition or by limiting the recognition, the public has participated in the
meaning-making of the mark.
Wilf has reached a similar approach, and "recognizes the dynamics of
author-public interaction and... [o]n the basis of this collaboration
between public and [trademark owners] he defends a joint property title to
the public in [such] intellectual creations." 251 He argues that trademarks
and their meaning-making are found by a process of three steps. The first
step is the association stage in which "a producer associates a sign with an
object." 252 Afterwards, this "association is recognized and invested with
meaning by the public as an interpretive community." 253 Finally, "the
object-sign association is contextualized within a broader cultural
248 Wilf, supra note 49, at 5. It is interesting to distinguish the case of trademarks with
other intellectual property rights. For example in copyrights, the rule is that the author enjoys
the full fight in his/her work and then comes the fair use doctrine to grant the public some
entitlements over the work, whereas in trademarks, the trademark owner's rights "are limited
ab initio because of the public contribution in creating the mark."
249 Id. at 6.
250 In Wilfs words, "[w]e [h]ave [m]et the [a]uthor and [h]e [i]s [u]s." Id. at 45.
251 Zemer, supra note 48, at 913.
252 Wilf, supra note 49, at 8.
253 ibid.
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context."
254
Wilf's argument is important, in the way it approaches the public role
in the creation of trademarks. However, it has some shortcomings. It seems
that Wilf did not recognize that ordinary marks are different from well
known trademarks. The three step procedures do not necessarily apply to
ordinary trademarks, and it is apparent that Wilf did not recognize that the
recognition of ordinary marks could be minimal, and hence the third step
may not apply to ordinary marks. However, this does not undermine Wilf s
approach. His sub-theory - The Public Authorship Model - is vitally
important because most of the literature in the field of trademarks does not
grant the public any recognition in the creation of trademarks. Furthermore,
Wilf's argument stresses the importance of theory in legitimizing and
balancing interests in trademarks between the owner and the public.
The public contributes to the creation of trademarks. This contribution
is manifested in the association it makes between the sign and the object,
and the meaning-making it which it participates. It follows that the public is
entitled to use trademarks in cultural and expressive contexts, and here
comes the need to balance the rights between the owner and the public. The
significance of the Social-Planning theory derives from the fact that it
overcomes the shortage of all the other theories. It recognizes how a
trademark is formulated and it rewards those who contribute in its creation;
the trademark owner and the public, and provides a balance between them.
Furthermore, this theory is "the juncture where practice and theory can meet
and contribute to each other's development." 255
C. Proposed rationale for the Social-Planning theory
This section is devoted to provide a clear vision regarding the Social-
Planning theory. This is important for the application of the Social-Planning
theory for a number of reasons. First, because the argument of this theory is
divided into a number of scholarly works, it is important to provide a clear
vision regarding this theory. Second, this theory comes from the need to
provide a solution to the extreme exaggeration of the extent of proprietary
rights granted to trademarks owners, thus the argument of this theory needs
to be clarified and well structured in order to legitimize the need for
drawing a balance in the conferred rights and the reason for recognizing the
public's entitlement in the context of trademarks.
254 ibid.
255 Zemer, supra note 9, at 66. Although Zemer was discussing the case of copyrights, his
argument may be applied to trademarks as well. He argues that "if we would invite into
discussions on copyright law and policy similar theoretical considerations, copyright laws
would not only reflect these issues but theories themselves would ensure that they do not
develop in isolation from what the 'real' intellectual property would need."
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This theory seeks to ensure that trademark systems are formulated to
achieve a just and attractive culture. In this culture, trademarks are a means
of democratic and civic dialogue. In order to achieve this goal, it is
necessary to perceive the formulation process of trademarks.
In the first stage of trademarks creation the trademark owner chooses
and/or invents a new word and affixes it on his/her goods and/or services,
and puts the article bearing the mark in circulation in the market. In the
second stage, and after the trademark is in circulation, the public starts to
recognize the mark. This stage is important because the degree of the
public's recognition determines the amount of protection granted to
trademarks. The public's recognition varies and is different from one mark
to another. In this sense, the public's role is crucial in determining the
amount of recognition that a mark deserves. In some instances the public's
recognition of a trademark is minimal, but this does not mean that the
public role in recognizing the mark does not exist and hence there is no
entitlement to the public in such marks. On the contrary, the public's role is
still strongly present because the public decided to grant limited recognition
to the mark. In other instances the recognition reaches a high level to the
extent that renders the mark generic.
256
Since the trademark owner and the public have contributed in the
creation of the trademark, then the owner and the public are the parties to
enjoy the rights and prerogatives in the mark. One the one hand, the
trademark owner shall enjoy the right to use his/her trademark in the course
of commerce, and to exclude others from using his/her mark in trade
context and on the same class of goods and/or services to which they are
registered and/or used. On the other hand, the public shall enjoy the right to
use the mark in cultural and expressive contexts, using it in expressing their
ideas, wills and needs, etc.
The public's consumption habits and the recognition of trademarks
lead to the use of trademarks for cultural and expressive purposes. This in
turn shall result in the meaning-making of the mark. Because, since the
public are allowed to practice their rights in the mark for cultural and
expressive purposes, then the mark could be attributed certain meanings
which are distinct from the use of trademark by its proprietor. This whole
process is the manner that makes trademarks a factor of achieving a just,
attractive and proper culture.
It should be also noted that in order to achieve a just and attractive
culture, trademarks should be accorded protection in the light of their main
function as source and origin identifiers. The benefits of this function are
that the owner's protection is confined to these boundaries. This means that
other traders are allowed to use the same mark on similar goods and/or
256 See supra text accompanying note 152.
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services if their use shall not confuse the public as to the source and origin
of the products in question. Emphasis should also be directed towards
protecting the consuming public against any use which is likely to cause
any confusion as to source and origin. This is vital because the public, who
attributed the association between the mark and the products, should retain
the right to maintain this association. Others should not alter or change this
association, otherwise they should be considered as infringers.
In conclusion, the Social-Planning theory recognizes the rights of the
trademark owner in protecting his/her mark as it identifies the source and
origin of his/her products. It ensures to other traders and rivals that they
shall be able to use the mark on similar or dissimilar products, if such use
shall not affect the ability of the senior mark from distinguishing the source
and origin of its owner. Finally, and most importantly, the public who is a
co-author of the mark should be protected from any use by other traders
which shall confuse it as to the source and origin of the products, and which
might alter the association it attributes to the mark. It shall enjoy the
fundamental right to use trademarks for cultural and expressive purposes.
All in all, the suggested justification of trademark systems is achieved
by linking the economic theory with the social institutional planning theory,
according to which trademarks are justifiable upon economic terms because
they reduce consumer search costs. Then the Social-Planning theory
regulates the rights and their grant to the right holders; the trademark owner
and the public. The benefit of the Social-Planning theory is that it defines
the limits of the parties' rights, admits the public role in the creation of
trademarks, and recognizes the right of the public to the expressive and
cultural use of trademarks, giving each party his due and achieving the
aimed justice.
VI.
CONCLUSION: THE VALUE OF "ECONOMIC-SOCIAL PLANNING" OF
TRADEMARKS
This article has discussed the theoretical justifications for trademarks.
It has clarified the importance and value of theory in the context of
trademarks. Theories underpinning trademarks are vital in determining the
parties in the trademark formula and the rights they are entitled to, and to
draw a balance between the right holders. This article has also clarified the
public's entitlements in regards to trademarks and its role in the meaning-
making of trademarks.
It has been argued and proved that the labor theory of property falls
short of justifying trademarks, mainly because this theory also fails to
justify why laboring is a basis for property. Such theory was designed to
legitimize tangible property and it does not pay heed to intangibles.
BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWJOURNAL
Moreover, when trying to apply its rationale to trademarks, the conclusion
is that the labor theory does not justify trademarks because the nature of
trademarks differs from that of tangible property.
As in the case of Locke's labor theory, the Hegelian personhood
approach also fails to justify trademarks, but for different reasons. Hegel's
theory embodies an argument for intangible property, but it does not apply
to trademarks because it fails to justify the alienability of trademarks, given
that trademarks reflect little or no personality of their creators.
This article has suggested a reinterpretation of the justification of
trademarks. This reinterpretation requires the drawing up of new
philosophical foundations of trademarks. This could be achieved through
what could be called "economic-social planning justification," which is the
combination of utilitarian and economic theory on the one hand and the
Social-Planning theory on the other hand, because as scholars argue "there
is no unitary justification for intellectual property." 257 This theoretical
framework, suggested by this article, starts from the premise that
trademarks are justifiable in economic terms due to the fact that they reduce
consumer search costs,258 and the role of the Social-Planning theory is to
set out the limits and boundaries of this.
Social-Planning theory is extremely important in comprehending the
way in which trademarks are "authored" 259 and created. It acknowledges
the public role in associating the mark with goods and/or services, a role
that is eligible for recognition and protection. Hence, the public is entitled
to use the mark for cultural and expressive uses, and others are entitled to
use the mark in goods and/or services in a different way from the use of the
original owner. More importantly, the Social-Planning theory assures a
fundamental human need which is the right of freedom of expression.
Finally, trademark scholars should employ extensive efforts to
envision the proper manner of combating the existing protection provided
by current legal systems. Super powers in today's world are directing a
huge effort towards maximizing and monopolizing the protection of
trademarks on an international level, and imposing this protection in other
jurisdictions. The aim of this is to protect the marks of their companies
everywhere in the world. As Aoki argues, trademark legislations should not
allow individuals and corporations, namely "Corporate America," to violate
and thieve the public's right in the meaning-making of trademarks. 260 It is
257 Zemer, supra note 9, at 70.
258 Adherence to utilitarian and economic theory should be understood in a strict manner
because the consumer search cost argument is the only reliable argument in this theory's
rationale. Arguments such as the incentive and the wealth maximization arguments are not
part of the suggested model.
259 Wilf(n49) 45-46.
260 Aoki (n208) 546.
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hoped that the suggested "economic-social planning" model could be a
gateway for more scholarship in favor of challenging this dilemma, leading
to greater clarity in respect of the basis of trademark protection.
